The Alliance Between the Crusaders and the Shiʿite Assassins During the Crusades

The history of the Crusades is often framed as a stark confrontation between Christian and Muslim powers. Yet the reality of Near Eastern politics in the 12th and 13th centuries was far more complex, shaped by shifting alliances, pragmatic diplomacy, and rivalries that transcended religious boundaries. One of the most striking examples of this complexity was the interaction—and at times cooperation—between the Crusaders and the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs, known in Western and some medieval Arabic sources as the “Assassins.”

Although the Nizārīs were a Shiʿite sect and the Crusaders represented Latin Christendom, both found themselves navigating a geopolitical landscape where survival required strategic flexibility. Far from being perpetual enemies, the two sides engaged in diplomacy, intelligence exchange, mutual non-aggression pacts, and even temporary alliances. These interactions reveal that the Crusades were not simply a clash of civilizations but a fluid contest of regional powers pursuing their own interests.

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Who Were the “Shiʿite Assassins”?

The term “Assassins” refers to the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs, a sect within the broader Ismāʿīlī Shiʿi tradition. After splitting from the Fatimid Caliphate in 1094, the Nizārīs established a network of mountain fortresses in Persia and Syria. Their communities operated under the leadership of the Imām or his deputies, and they developed a reputation—often exaggerated by enemies—for targeted political killings carried out by fida’īs (devoted adherents).

In Syria, their most famous leader was Rashīd al-Dīn Sinān, known to the Crusaders as “The Old Man of the Mountain.” From his base at Masyaf, Sinān conducted sophisticated diplomacy with local Muslim rulers and Crusader states alike.

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Why the Crusaders and the Nizārīs Found Common Ground

Despite their ideological differences, shared strategic interests often pushed the Crusaders and Nizārīs into cooperation.

1. Mutual Hostility to Sunni Powers

The Nizārīs faced constant pressure from Sunni rulers, particularly the Seljuks, Zengids, and later the Ayyubids under Saladin. Many of these same powers were the primary enemies of the Crusader states.

This created a simple geopolitical reality:
“The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

For the Nizārīs, Crusader neutrality—or even limited cooperation—offered protection from annihilation. For the Crusaders, Nizārī hostility toward Sunni rulers weakened their common adversaries.

2. Pragmatic Diplomacy Over Ideology

Unlike the zealous portrayal often found in popular imagination, both groups practiced realpolitik. Crusader leaders such as King Amalric I of Jerusalem and the Franks of Tripoli recognized that the Nizārīs, though formidable, could become valuable partners. Similarly, the Nizārīs pursued calculated diplomacy with Christian powers when it served their survival.

3. Shared Borders and Interdependence

In Syria, Nizārī fortresses were surrounded by Crusader holdings. Peaceful relations were essential for trade, travel, and safety. Outright conflict would have threatened both sides.

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Key Episodes of Crusader–Nizārī Interaction

1. The Proposed Alliance with King Amalric I (1160s)

One of the earliest documented interactions is the attempt by King Amalric I of Jerusalem to negotiate a formal alliance with the Nizārīs. Envoys traveled between Jerusalem and Masyaf, and both sides expressed willingness to establish peaceful relations.

Christian chronicles even claim—though not conclusively—that the Nizārīs considered converting to Christianity, motivated by the hope of securing powerful allies against Sunni rivals. Most historians view this claim skeptically; it likely reflects exaggerated interpretations of diplomatic overtures. Nevertheless, the negotiations demonstrate close communication between the two groups.

The talks ultimately ended when a delegation of Nizārī envoys, returning from a meeting with Amalric, was killed by Hospitallers—an act the king condemned but could not prevent.

2. The Assassination Attempts on Saladin

The Nizārīs twice attempted to assassinate Saladin, the greatest adversary of the Crusaders.

• The first attempt (1174) occurred as Saladin sought to consolidate power in Syria.

• The second (1176) happened during the siege of Aleppo.

Although some Crusader chroniclers imply that the Franks encouraged or supported these attempts, there is no direct proof. However, it is clear that Saladin’s enemies, including certain Crusader factions, benefited from Nizārī hostility to him.

Saladin eventually negotiated peace with the Nizārīs, but the fact that they tried to eliminate his leadership at critical moments indirectly benefited the Crusader states struggling against his growing power.

3. The Encounter Between Richard the Lionheart and the Nizārīs

During the Third Crusade, Richard I of England reportedly interacted with the Nizārīs, perhaps even receiving envoys from them after they killed Conrad of Montferrat in 1192. European sources claimed the Nizārīs murdered Conrad at Richard’s request; Muslim sources denied this.

Modern historians tend to dismiss the accusation as Crusader internal propaganda. Still, the very fact that such accusations were plausible reflects the perception of flexible relationships between Crusader leaders and the Nizārīs.

4. Non-Aggression and Tribute Arrangements

In several periods, Crusader lords—especially in Tripoli—entered into agreements with the Nizārīs to:

• cease hostilities,

• allow safe passage,

• and exchange intelligence.

Some Crusader states may even have received tribute from Nizārī communities in exchange for protection or neutrality, though evidence is scattered and debated.

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The Assassination of Raymond II of Tripoli

One episode often cited in support of the alliance theory is the assassination of Count Raymond II of Tripoli in 1152 by Nizārī fida’īs. While some interpret this as hostility, others argue it was tied to local rivalries and internal Crusader disputes rather than religious conflict.

Significantly, after this killing, relations eventually normalized, demonstrating the pragmatic nature of Nizārī–Crusader diplomacy.

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How Both Sides Benefited

Benefits to the Crusaders:

• Disruption of Sunni political unity

• Safe borders near Nizārī territories

• Intelligence networks that the Nizārīs were renowned for

• Potential assassinations of mutual enemies (though difficult to verify)

Benefits to the Nizārīs:

• Neutrality or protection against Crusader hostility

• Pressure against their Sunni adversaries

• Access to trade and resources through Crusader lands

• Diplomatic recognition in the face of Sunni hostility

At crucial moments—especially during the rise of Saladin—Nizārī hostility to Sunni rulers indirectly benefited the Crusaders even without formal alliance.

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Why the Alliance Did Not Become Permanent

Despite shared interests, no long-term alliance emerged.

Religion Remained a Barrier

Even though both sides practiced diplomacy, fundamental theological differences prevented deeper cooperation.

Internal Crusader Divisions

The Franks were divided between factions such as the Templars, Hospitallers, and the royal court, making consistent policy difficult.

Changing Political Realities

After Saladin’s consolidation and later the Mongol invasions, the political landscape shifted dramatically. The Nizārīs and Crusaders no longer shared the same opportunities or threats.

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Conclusion: A Pragmatic Partnership in a Turbulent Age

The interactions between the Crusaders and the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs illustrate the pragmatism and complexity of medieval politics. Far from being rigid enemies defined solely by religion, both sides navigated alliances based on survival, shared interests, and geopolitical necessity. They cooperated when convenient, negotiated when necessary, and fought when circumstances demanded.

The relationship was never a formal, long-lasting alliance, but rather a series of strategic accommodations shaped by mutual enemies and regional pressures. This nuanced reality challenges simplified narratives of the Crusades and reveals a world where diplomacy frequently crossed religious boundaries–a reminder that history is rarely as black and white as legend suggests.

Sunnis consider All Shiites as Disbelievers Except the Zaidites?

Relations between Sunnis and the various branches of Shiʿism have long been shaped by political history, doctrinal differences, and the polemical literature of different eras. One claim that appears in some medieval Sunni heresiographical texts, and is sometimes repeated in polemical contexts today, is that Sunnis consider all Shiʿites to be disbelievers (kuffār) except the Zaydīs. While such a statement reflects certain strands of polemical writing, it does not represent the mainstream Sunni legal or theological position, nor does it account for the diversity of Shiʿi communities or the complexity of Sunni jurisprudence on sectarian classification.

This article examines the origins of the claim, the actual Sunni legal stance, and the historical nuances that shaped perceptions of the Zaydīs and other Shiʿi groups.

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1. Why Such a Claim Arose in Some Polemical Traditions

To understand the origins of the assertion, one must look at the polemical atmosphere of the late Umayyad, Abbasid, and post-Seljuk eras, especially during times of political and military conflict between Sunni rulers and certain Shiʿi groups. Heresiographers such as al-Baghdādī, Ibn Ḥazm, and Ibn Taymiyya wrote during periods of intense rivalry between Sunni powers and political movements associated with Twelver, Ismāʿīlī, or extremist (ghulāt) Shiʿism.

Three main factors contributed to harsh categorizations:

a. Political Conflict

• The Fatimid Caliphate, an Ismāʿīlī Shiʿi state, rivaled the Abbasids.

• The Qarmaṭians attacked pilgrimage caravans and even sacked Mecca in 930 CE.

• The Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs (“Assassins”) were in violent conflict with Seljuks and Zengids.

Political enmity often spilled into theological rhetoric.

b. Ghulāt (extremist) sects

Historical Shiʿism included groups that believed in:

• the divinity of Imams,

• reincarnation,

• prophetic status for figures after Muhammad.

Sunni scholars universally classified such sects as outside Islam. Over time, polemicists often blurred distinctions between these groups and mainstream Shiʿism.

c. Simplification in Heresiographical Literature

Works like al-Farq bayn al-Firaq or al-Milal wa al-Niḥal tended to categorize large religious communities into rigid boxes, often overstating doctrinal differences and underestimating internal diversity.

These conditions created space for the claim that only the relatively moderate Zaydīs were not considered disbelievers.

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2. Zaydīs as Seen in Sunni Tradition

Zaydīs—predominant in Yemen—are often described by Sunni scholars as the closest Shiʿi group to Sunnism. This perception rests on several factors:

a. Theology

Zaydī theology resembles Muʿtazilism, which—though opposed by many Sunnis—remains within the fold of Islam according to Sunni legal consensus.

b. View of the Imamate

Zaydīs:

• accept the leadership of any qualified descendant of Ḥasan or Ḥusayn who rises against injustice,

• do not endorse the infallibility or divine designation of Imams,

• do not anathematize Abu Bakr and ʿUmar.

This last point is key: Sunni jurists generally accepted that reviling the Companions is sinful, but not automatically disbelief unless it includes explicit accusations that undermine the fundamentals of Islam.

c. Ritual and Law

Zaydī fiqh is close to Sunni jurisprudence, especially the Hanafī school in matters of analogy and legal theory.

For these reasons, many Sunni legal manuals describe the Zaydīs as a “non-Sunni but Muslim” sect.

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3. Mainstream Sunni Legal Position on Shiʿites

Contrary to polemical claims, mainstream Sunni jurisprudence does not classify all Shiʿites as disbelievers. The legal schools (madhāhib) differentiate between:

1. Twelvers (Jaʿfarīs)

2. Ismāʿīlīs (including Fatimid and Nizārī branches)

3. Zaydīs

4. Ghulāt extremists

Only the last category—those who attributed divinity to Imams or rejected core pillars of Islam—were unanimously classified as outside the fold.

a. Hanafī Scholars

Abū Ḥanīfa and later Hanafīs generally held that:

• Shiʿites are Muslims as long as they do not deny established essentials of Islam.

• Twelvers are valid marriage partners.

• Their slaughtered meat is permissible.

b. Mālikī Scholars

While critical, Mālikīs did not declare Twelvers or Zaydīs as disbelievers. Imām Mālik reportedly said that cursing the Companions was innovation (bidʿa), not kufr.

c. Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī Scholars

Some Hanbalī and Shāfiʿī polemicists held harsher views, especially regarding those who cursed Abu Bakr and ʿUmar. Yet even they generally distinguished:

• Shiʿi revilers (fussāq, sinners)
  from

• Ghulāt extremists (heretics or unbelievers).

Ibn Taymiyya—sometimes cited as evidence of Sunni takfīr of Shiʿites—explicitly wrote that most Twelver Shiʿites are not disbelievers, even though he harshly criticized their doctrines.

d. The Consensus of Sunni Legal Texts

Across all four madhāhib:

• Twelvers are Muslims, albeit holding mistaken or innovated beliefs.

• Zaydīs are Muslims, closest to Sunnism.

• Ismāʿīlīs vary—some branches (Fatimid) are regarded as heretical but still within Islam; extremist branches fall outside.

• Ghulāt groups are outside Islam due to beliefs contradicting monotheism.

Thus, the sweeping claim that Sunnis view all Shiʿites as disbelievers is historically incorrect.

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4. Why the “Zaydīs Are the Exception” Narrative Persisted

Several factors explain why some writers—especially medieval Sunnis—highlighted the Zaydīs as the “only acceptable” Shiʿi group:

a. Political Alliances

Zaydī Imams often allied with Sunni powers against common enemies, creating pragmatic respect across sectarian lines.

b. Mutual Recognition

Because Zaydīs accepted:

• the legitimacy of Abu Bakr and ʿUmar (even if conditionally),

• the fallibility of Imams,

• mainstream Islamic ritual law,

Sunni scholars found fewer theological objections to them.

c. Contrast with Rival Shiʿi Powers

During periods when Sunni states fought the Fatimids or Nizārīs, praising the Zaydīs implicitly criticized more radical opponents.

d. The “Spectrum” of Shiʿism

Heresiographers often arranged Shiʿi groups on a spectrum:

• Zaydīs = moderate

• Twelvers = innovators

• Ismāʿīlīs = heretical

• Ghulāt = unbelievers

This gradient was more descriptive than doctrinal.

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5. Contemporary Sunni Scholarship

Modern Sunni institutions (e.g., al-Azhar) classify:

• Shiʿites as Muslims,

• marriage between Sunnis and Shiʿites as valid,

• and Twelver fiqh as a recognized school in Islamic jurisprudence.

Contemporary fatwas emphasize unity and reject sectarian takfīr.

The claim that “Sunnis consider all Shiʿites unbelievers except the Zaydīs” is therefore:

• historically rooted in polemics,

• not representing Sunni theological orthodoxy,

• and not reflective of contemporary Sunni jurisprudence.

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Conclusion

The assertion that Sunnis consider all Shiʿites to be disbelievers except the Zaydīs reflects a polemical tradition, not the established, nuanced view of Sunni legal and theological scholarship. While Zaydīs were historically seen as the closest Shiʿi group to Sunnism, mainstream Sunni jurists recognized Twelvers and most Ismāʿīlīs as Muslims, even while strongly disagreeing with their doctrines.

The real picture is far more complex, shaped by political conflict, sectarian rhetoric, and the evolution of both Sunni and Shiʿi thought over the centuries. Understanding these nuances is essential for moving beyond simplistic narratives and appreciating the diverse theological landscape of the Islamic tradition.

Even Al-Ghazali had faced Death Threats from the Batinite Shiites

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), one of the most influential scholars in Islamic intellectual history, lived during an era marked by political turmoil, sectarian rivalry, and the rise of revolutionary movements. Among the most formidable of these groups were the Bāṭinite Shiʿites, often associated with the Ismāʿīlī movement and, in some historical sources, with the Nizārī community led by Ḥasan-i Ṣabbāḥ—popularly linked to the so-called “Assassins.” The Bāṭinites were active across Persia, Iraq, and Syria, and their reputation for political infiltration and targeted killings made them deeply feared in the Seljuk world.

Even a scholar as esteemed as al-Ghazālī was not immune to the tensions of his time. Historical accounts describe how his intellectual critiques of the Bāṭinite doctrines placed him in direct opposition to a movement known for violent reprisals. As a result, al-Ghazālī faced serious threats—threats that shaped both his career and the tone of some of his writings.

Sectarian Turmoil in the 11th Century

To understand why al-Ghazālī became a target, one must appreciate the political landscape of the late 11th century. The Seljuk Empire was at its height, and Sunni political authority was tightly interwoven with the legitimacy of the Caliphate in Baghdad. By contrast, the Ismāʿīlīs had established a powerful rival caliphate in Egypt under the Fatimids. The ideological battle between the two systems was fierce, with each claiming to be the rightful representative of Islam.

The Bāṭinite Shiʿites, operating in Persia and Iraq, posed a direct challenge to Seljuk political and religious authority. Their strategy was not merely theological persuasion but also political subversion, often through the establishment of secret cells and occasional political assassinations. Whether exaggerated or not, their reputation struck fear into Seljuk administrators, scholars, and military officials.

Al-Ghazālī’s Involvement in the Political-Religious Struggle

Al-Ghazālī rose to prominence in the midst of this conflict. Appointed as professor at the prestigious Niẓāmiyya Madrasa in Baghdad by the powerful vizier Niẓām al-Mulk, he became one of the most important Sunni voices of his era. Niẓām al-Mulk himself was a major target of the Bāṭinites and was eventually assassinated in 1092 by a disguised operative. This event shook the empire and heightened anxieties about Bāṭinite influence.

Part of al-Ghazālī’s scholarly mission—encouraged by the Seljuk court—was to intellectually dismantle the arguments of groups seen as destabilizing to the Sunni order. His famous work Faḍāʾiḥ al-Bāṭiniyya (“The Infamies of the Bāṭinites”), also known as al-Mustazhiri (written for the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustazhir), directly attacked the theological foundations of Bāṭinite doctrine. In it, al-Ghazālī criticized their esoteric interpretation of scripture, their political secrecy, and their hierarchical structure centered on absolute obedience to the Imām.

This book alone would have been enough to attract hostility—but al-Ghazālī went further, addressing the political danger he believed the movement posed to the Muslim world. As his critique spread, so too did concerns for his safety.

Evidence of Threats Against Al-Ghazālī

Medieval biographers such as Ibn al-Jawzī and al-Subkī record that al-Ghazālī faced credible threats to his life from the Bāṭinite faction. Although the historical record is fragmented—as is common with events over nine centuries old—several strands of evidence point to the seriousness of the danger:

1. His departure from Baghdad in 1095
   Al-Ghazālī’s sudden, dramatic withdrawal from his position—explained publicly as a spiritual crisis—may also have been influenced by mounting political pressures. Some biographers note the climate of fear following the assassination of Niẓām al-Mulk and the continued activity of Bāṭinite agents. The combination of personal anxiety, sectarian violence, and intellectual conflicts formed a potent backdrop to his departure.

2. His cautious return to teaching
   When he later returned to public life in Ṭūs and Nishapur, al-Ghazālī remained under the protection of local authorities. Scholars have interpreted this caution as a sign that threats had neither been forgotten nor ignored.

3. The political nature of his anti-Bāṭinite writings
   The directness with which he attacked their doctrines—far more sharply than he criticized philosophers or other Islamic sects—suggests both the urgency of the threat and the risks associated with his stance.

Whether or not the Bāṭinites actively plotted to kill him (as some later narratives claim), his contemporaries clearly believed the danger was real.

Why Al-Ghazālī Was Targeted

From the perspective of the Bāṭinite movement, al-Ghazālī represented several threats:

• He was the intellectual arm of the Seljuk state, helping articulate Sunni orthodoxy against Ismāʿīlī teachings.

• His works delegitimized their theological structure, arguing that their hidden hierarchy was neither Qur’anic nor in harmony with Islamic tradition.

• He had enormous influence, teaching students who would spread his refutations across the Islamic world.

In an age where political and theological authority were inseparable, al-Ghazālī’s pen had immense power. And power invited danger.

Impact on Al-Ghazālī’s Thought

Some historians argue that the climate of threats and sectarian tension influenced al-Ghazālī’s intellectual and spiritual development.

His retreat from public life, detailed in al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl (“Deliverance from Error”), is often read solely as a personal spiritual awakening. But the political backdrop cannot be ignored: the dangers of public intellectual life, the assassination of his patron, and the hostility of rival groups created an environment where retreat offered not only spiritual clarity but also physical safety.

Furthermore, after returning from his long period of seclusion, al-Ghazālī placed greater emphasis on reviving the spiritual and moral dimensions of Islam, as seen in his monumental Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn. This shift from political-theological polemics toward ethical and mystical revivalism may reflect his desire to move beyond the violent sectarian disputes of his time.

Legacy: A Scholar Who Survived Turbulent Times

Al-Ghazālī ultimately survived an era in which political assassination was a real and present danger. His works outlived both the Seljuk Empire and the Bāṭinite militant cells. Ironically, the Ismāʿīlī tradition itself also evolved over time, moving away from the revolutionary politics of the 11th century and becoming an important intellectual force in later Islamic history.

Today, al-Ghazālī is remembered as:

• A theologian who defended Sunni orthodoxy

• A philosopher who bridged rationalism and spirituality

• A mystic whose writings continue to inspire

• A survivor of a violent and politically charged age

The fact that even a scholar of his stature faced death threats illustrates the intensity of the ideological battles of his era. His courage in writing against movements he believed dangerous—despite the risks—adds another dimension to his legacy.

Conclusion

The life of al-Ghazālī was shaped not only by intellectual exploration but also by the turbulence of his time. His confrontations with the Bāṭinite Shiʿites highlight the intersection of theology, politics, and personal danger in the medieval Islamic world. Facing threats from one of the most feared revolutionary groups of his age, al-Ghazālī responded not with silence but with some of the most influential works in Islamic history.

In doing so, he demonstrated that the scholar’s pen—though vulnerable—could still shape civilizations long after the conflicts of the moment had faded.

Al-Qaradawi Denounced Hezbollah, Iran Support for Assad’s Tyranny

The Arab uprisings that erupted in 2011 reshaped political alliances, ideological landscapes, and sectarian fault lines across the Middle East. Among the influential voices who addressed the seismic events was Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Sunni scholar and long-standing figure of the Muslim Brotherhood’s intellectual tradition. His denunciation of Hezbollah and Iran for their support of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria marked one of the most consequential moments in contemporary Islamic political discourse. It signaled a definitive rupture in what many had previously hailed as a “resistance axis” uniting Sunni and Shiite forces against Western intervention and Israeli occupation.

Background: A Legacy of Influence

For decades, al-Qaradawi commanded significant authority among mainstream Sunni audiences. Through his writing, leadership within the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), and his widely viewed Al Jazeera program “Sharia and Life,” he shaped public opinion on religious, political, and societal issues across the Muslim world.

Before the Syrian uprising, al-Qaradawi had expressed admiration for Hezbollah’s role in resisting Israel, particularly during the 2006 Lebanon War. Many Sunni scholars, activists, and political movements similarly hailed Hezbollah’s military capacity and Iran’s defiance of Western powers. This created, for a time, a rare space of Sunni-Shiite political alignment centered on anti-occupation narratives.

Yet this fragile sense of unity collapsed as events unfolded in Syria.

The Syrian Uprising and Its Brutal Repression

In early 2011, peaceful protests erupted in Syria, echoing the demands for dignity, political participation, and social justice witnessed in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The Syrian regime responded with a harsh crackdown—first with mass arrests and violent dispersal of demonstrations, then with large-scale military operations, bombardments, and sieges.

As the conflict escalated into a civil war, Hezbollah and Iran intervened militarily on Assad’s behalf. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps provided strategic advisory roles, intelligence support, weapons, and financial backing. Hezbollah deployed thousands of fighters to key battlegrounds such as Qusayr, Aleppo, and the Qalamoun region. Their involvement marked a decisive turning point in the war, strengthening the Syrian regime at a time when opposition groups were gaining territory.

For al-Qaradawi, this direct participation in what he viewed as the violent repression of Syrian civilians constituted a moral red line.

Al-Qaradawi’s Break with Hezbollah and Iran

In 2013, al-Qaradawi delivered one of his most forceful public statements, declaring that he had been mistaken in previously supporting Hezbollah. He characterized the group as “the party of Satan,” a dramatic rhetorical shift that shocked many who had witnessed his long-standing admiration for its anti-Israel posture.

Al-Qaradawi argued that Hezbollah’s actions in Syria were not merely a matter of geopolitical alignment but constituted a religious and ethical betrayal. By assisting Assad’s assault on predominantly Sunni towns and cities, the group had, in his view, helped perpetrate mass atrocities. He accused Iran of using sectarian mobilization and military intervention to preserve a regime that had lost legitimacy through its violent suppression of dissent.

His denunciation served multiple functions:

1. A Moral Verdict: Al-Qaradawi framed the conflict in ethical terms, portraying the Syrian government’s repression as a tyranny incompatible with Islamic principles of justice and protection of the innocent.

2. A Religious Reassessment: The break with Hezbollah symbolized a broader Sunni re-evaluation of Iran’s regional ambitions. Many Sunni scholars who had previously praised Iranian defiance of Western pressure now saw its actions in Syria as expansionist and sectarian.

3. A Political Realignment: The statement reinforced a developing regional polarization between Sunni-led governments backing insurgent forces and Shiite-aligned powers supporting Assad.

Reactions in the Arab and Muslim Worlds

Al-Qaradawi’s denunciation had enormous resonance. Supporters of the Syrian opposition praised his stance as a courageous defense of a population under siege. Many argued that his moral authority provided legitimacy to calls for greater international and regional pressure on Assad’s government.

However, critics accused him of deepening sectarian divisions. Shiite scholars and pro-Hezbollah supporters argued that his framing of the conflict risked inflaming sectarian rhetoric and overshadowing the geopolitical complexities of the war. They maintained that Hezbollah and Iran were defending a state threatened by extremist groups and foreign intervention.

Despite these criticisms, al-Qaradawi’s message became a defining focal point in the broader Sunni-Shiite discourse surrounding the Syrian conflict. His statements were widely circulated in sermons, media discussions, and political debates, further entrenching sharply divergent narratives about the war.

Sectarian Tensions and the Dynamics of Power

Al-Qaradawi’s denunciation cannot be divorced from the region’s longstanding sectarian undercurrents. Though the Syrian uprising began as a civic movement, the regime’s crackdown—and the subsequent influx of regional and international actors—intensified sectarian identities on both sides.

Hezbollah justified its intervention as necessary to prevent Syria from falling into chaos and to protect Lebanon from extremist spillover. Iran framed the conflict as part of a broader regional struggle against Western interference and militant jihadist movements.

By contrast, al-Qaradawi and many Sunni leaders viewed the war as a popular revolution crushed by brute force, with Iran and Hezbollah complicit in preserving authoritarian tyranny. His invocation of religious rhetoric highlighted the moral urgency he attributed to opposing Assad, but it also fed into a wider sectarian polarization that shaped the war’s discourse.

The Aftermath and Lingering Consequences

More than a decade later, al-Qaradawi’s denunciation remains a significant moment in the regional conversation about Syria. The war devastated the country, causing hundreds of thousands of deaths and displacing millions. Hezbollah’s involvement significantly altered the military trajectory of the conflict, contributing to Assad’s survival.

Meanwhile, sectarian tensions across the region—already stoked by earlier political rivalries—intensified further. Al-Qaradawi’s break with Hezbollah symbolized the collapse of the brief period in which cross-sectarian political cooperation had seemed possible.

Today, his statements form part of a larger historical record documenting how the Syrian war reshaped ideological positions and reconfigured alliances. His criticisms reflected not only his moral and religious views but also a major reorientation in Sunni political thought regarding Iran’s regional role.

Conclusion

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s denunciation of Hezbollah and Iran for supporting Bashar al-Assad’s “tyranny” marked a turning point in Middle Eastern political discourse. Once celebrated for its resistance against Israel, Hezbollah became, in his eyes, an enabler of oppression and mass violence in Syria. This shift encapsulated a broader recalibration of regional alliances, puncturing earlier visions of Sunni-Shiite unity against external adversaries.

Through his influential voice, al-Qaradawi articulated a moral critique of authoritarianism and foreign intervention in Syria. Yet his denunciation also reflected and intensified existing sectarian divides, illustrating the complex interplay of religion, politics, and conflict in shaping the modern Middle East.

The Zaidite Shiites Do Not Regard the Companions of Muhammad as Disbelievers

Among the diverse branches of Islam, Shiism is often discussed in terms of its major theological distinctions from Sunni Islam—especially regarding the status of the Prophet Muhammad’s companions and the question of legitimate leadership after his death. Yet within Shiism itself exists a wide range of interpretations, communities, and historical experiences. Among these groups, the Zaidite (or Zaidi) Shiites stand out as a unique tradition whose views on the early Muslim community differ significantly from those of the Twelver and Ismaili branches. One of the clearest examples is their stance toward the Companions of the Prophet (ṣaḥābah). Unlike some other Shiite groups, the Zaidites do not consider the Companions to be disbelievers, nor do they condemn them wholesale. Instead, their approach is more nuanced and historically grounded, shaped by political context, jurisprudential reasoning, and a different understanding of religious authority.

Origins of Zaidi Shiism: A Political Theology

To understand the Zaidite position, it is important to look briefly at its origins. Zaidi Shiism is the earliest surviving branch of Shiism and is named after Zayd ibn ʿAlī (d. 740 CE), the great-grandson of the Prophet Muhammad through al-Ḥusayn. Zayd led an uprising in Kufa against the Umayyad caliphate, and although he was killed, his teachings inspired a movement that preserved his name and ideas.

Politically, Zaydi Shiism emphasizes:

• the duty to oppose unjust rulers,

• the legitimacy of any qualified descendant of Ḥasan or Ḥusayn who rises against tyranny, and

• the centrality of justice and moral uprightness in leadership.

Unlike Twelver Shiism, which focuses on a line of twelve infallible imams, the Zaidis adopt a model in which the imam must demonstrate leadership through action—primarily by resisting oppression. The result is a school of thought that is activist, juristically rigorous, and less dependent on metaphysical doctrines about the imam’s nature.

These theological differences have direct implications for how Zaidis view the earliest generations of Muslims.

A Nuanced View of the Companions

In mainstream Sunni Islam, the Companions of the Prophet hold an esteemed status, and many Sunnis believe criticizing them is a serious religious error. In contrast, some historic Shiite sects—particularly radical or “ghulāt” groups—have at times condemned many Companions as apostates for not supporting ʿAlī after the Prophet’s death.

The Zaidis, however, occupy a middle position, refusing to endorse extreme views on either side.

Zaidite thought typically holds that:

• The Companions were not infallible,

• They made political mistakes,

• Some actions—especially regarding succession—were wrong or unjust,

• But these mistakes do not constitute unbelief (kufr).

This distinction between political error (khataʾ) and religious disbelief (kufr) is central to Zaidite theology. For the Zaidis, to disagree with ʿAlī’s right to leadership is not the same as rejecting Islam itself. Therefore, while Zaidis may criticize certain decisions made after the Prophet’s death—such as the choice of the first three caliphs—the criticism is ethical and political, not accusatory of apostasy.

Why Zaidis Reject Takfīr of the Companions

Takfīr (declaring someone to be a disbeliever) is a serious act in Islamic thought, and the Zaidis historically rejected using it against the earliest Muslims for several reasons.

1. A Commitment to Justice Over Dogma

Zaidite theology emphasizes the practical implementation of justice rather than metaphysical claims about infallibility. Most Zaidite scholars saw no evidence that the Companions intentionally sought to undermine Islam. They may have disagreed with ʿAlī’s political legitimacy, but disagreement alone does not equal disbelief. Their actions are judged in a political framework rather than a doctrinal one.

2. Distinguishing Error From Apostasy

A crucial Zaidite principle is that moral or political error does not expel a person from the faith. Many Companions fought, disagreed, and even went to war with one another in early Islamic history. Zaidis acknowledge these conflicts but do not interpret them as signs of apostasy.

The Companions are human beings capable of good and bad actions; their mistakes do not define their faith.

3. Zayd ibn ʿAlī’s Own Example

Zayd ibn ʿAlī himself is reported to have refused to condemn Abu Bakr and ʿUmar as disbelievers when questioned by his followers. Instead, he recognized their early contributions to Islam even while disagreeing with their political decisions. For Zayd, their failure to support ʿAlī did not mean they had abandoned the faith.

This approach became foundational in Zaidite thought.

4. Avoiding Sectarian Extremism

Historically, the Zaidis have been wary of radical sectarianism and “ghulūw” (extremism). While they honor the Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet’s family) profoundly, they avoid attributing supernatural qualities or infallibility to the imams. As a result, they do not see the Companions’ political opposition to ʿAlī as a cosmic betrayal demanding religious excommunication.

Zaidism and Sunni Islam: Points of Convergence

Zaidis are often described as the Shiites closest to Sunnis, particularly in jurisprudence. Their legal methodology is influenced by early rationalist traditions and shares much with Sunni schools of law. Because they do not curse or anathematize the Companions, Zaidism has historically coexisted more easily with Sunni communities.

For example:

• Many Zaidis accept the historical validity of the first three caliphs while still maintaining that ʿAlī was the superior choice.

• They reject the Twelver doctrine of the imams’ infallibility, aligning more closely with Sunni understandings of leadership.

• They avoid symbolic rituals that criticize the Companions—practices that exist in some other Shiite traditions.

As a result, Yemen, the historical heartland of Zaidism, has long been characterized by a degree of coexistence between Zaidis and Sunnis that is less common in other Shiite-majority regions.

Criticism Without Condemnation

One of the distinguishing features of Zaidite discourse is the ability to criticize early Muslim political decisions while avoiding moral absolutism. For Zaidis:

• The Companions who opposed ʿAlī acted wrongly,

• But their wrong actions do not require labeling them unbelievers,

• Nor do they invalidate their status as early Muslims whose efforts shaped Islam.

This position allows Zaidism to uphold devotion to the Prophet’s family (the hallmark of Shiism) while simultaneously maintaining respect for the broader early Muslim community.

Contemporary Significance

Today, most Zaidis live in Yemen, where they form a significant portion of the population. In modern times, Zaidite scholars continue to emphasize moderation, coexistence, and the rejection of sectarian takfīr. Especially in an era of rising sectarian tensions, the Zaidite position serves as a reminder of the diversity and nuance within Islamic intellectual traditions.

Conclusion

The Zaidite Shiites occupy a distinctive place in Islamic history—a movement rooted in devotion to the Prophet’s family but equally committed to justice, moderation, and rationality. Their refusal to regard the Companions of Muhammad as disbelievers reflects a broader theological ethos: one that values moral integrity and historical realism over rigid polemics.

By distinguishing political disagreement from religious unbelief, Zaidism provides an example of how early Islamic diversity can be understood without resorting to condemnation or sectarian antagonism. Their balanced approach continues to offer insight into the possibilities of coexistence and mutual respect across the Muslim world.

The Empire of the Biblical Antichrist (The Shi'ite Mahdi) will Cover the Whole Globe except Makkah and Madinah

Introduction

Eschatological traditions across religions often present a final, global sovereign—either for good or evil—who will dominate much of the world before a final judgment or transformation. Within certain strands of Shiʿite Islam, the figure of Imam al-Mahdi is envisaged as a saviour-king who will establish a universal rule of justice. In Christian apocalyptic scenarios the figure of the Antichrist similarly takes dominion over the earth prior to the return of Christ. This article explores the Shiʿite Mahdist scenario of global rule, its intersections and contrasts with the “Antichrist empire” motif, and the specific idea (in some sources) that the Mahdi’s empire will stretch globally except for the Hejaz cities of Makkah and Madinah. While this is not a mainstream, universally held formulation, it draws on a mix of Islamic eschatological texts and modern interpretations.

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The Shiʿite Mahdi: Doctrine and Mission

Within Twelver Shiʿism the Mahdi (the Twelfth Imam) is a hidden saviour who will re-appear at the end of time. Iranica Online+2Harvard Projects+2 The Encyclopaedia Iranica notes that Imami eschatology “is completely dominated by the figure of the Mahdi… his manifestation … and the situation of the world at the time of these events.” Iranica Online According to such traditions:

• The world will be filled with injustice, oppression, decay of religion. Iranica Online+1

• At the right time the Mahdi will emerge, unify the faithful, and fill the earth with justice as it was filled with injustice. wwmf.org+1

• His rule is often described as universal: not just a regional domain, but a global transformation (sometimes interpreted as world-government) in which Islam becomes predominant. The Thinking Muslim -+2IJHSSI+2

One key contemporary analysis (“The Hidden Imam and the End of Time: A Primer on the Mahdi”) emphasises that the idea of a global mission is embedded in Shiʿite eschatological and political imagination. Harvard Projects

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The Global Empire Scenario

In many Mahdist hadiths and Shiʿite narratives, the Mahdi is depicted as conquering or converting wide territories, extending his authority over east and west, over Muslims and non-Muslims, until the world is under a just order. For example: “He will occupy the east and the west of the world, bringing everything under his command.” The Thinking Muslim - Some sources note that his companions (sometimes said to number 313) will wield great strength and will subdue the nations. IJHSSI The scenario therefore resembles, in broad outline, the Christian apocalyptic image of the Antichrist’s world-dominion, though the character is different (a messianic saviour vs a deceiver).

Importantly, one passage in the Iranica article states: “The army of the Qāʾem … Ḥejāz, Iraq, the east, Egypt, Syria, and then Constantinople will be conquered before the entire world submits to the saviour.” Iranica Online That suggests a step-by-step global subjection under the Mahdi.

Thus, the “empire” envisioned is: a unified global polity, centered in Islamic eschatology, where the Mahdi reigns, and international boundaries as known today are abolished or overridden by this eschatological rule.

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The Exception of Makkah and Madinah?

The particular motif that the “empire” covers the whole globe except Makkah and Madinah is less evident in standard academic sources. Many texts indicate that the Mahdi emerges from or gathers at Makkah or the Hejaz. For example: “The rising will occur … when the Mahdi launches his appeal from Mecca.” Iranica Online Some sources say that his uprising begins in the Hejaz and then moves outwards.

However, the idea of excluding Makkah or Madinah from his empire is not well-documented in mainstream Shiʿite eschatological literature. Some fringe or modern popular interpretations may mention that certain cities are spared or reserved for other roles in the final drama. Without strong textual evidence, this part of the scenario remains speculative.

It may reflect the mixing of Christian-Apocalyptic frameworks (where Jerusalem or specific holy cities are exempt from Antichrist domination) with Islamic eschatology. Thus, while the global conquest motif is part of Mahdist belief, the precise exception of the two holy cities of Islam (Makkah and Madinah) is not a consensus position.

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Comparison with the Biblical Antichrist Motif

From the Christian perspective, the Antichrist is a figure who comes and deceives the world, establishes a reign of wickedness, and then is overcome by Christ. The Mahdi scenario is somewhat inverted: the Mahdi is the good saviour who brings justice, rather than the evil ruler. Some modern interpretative frameworks (especially in Christian-Muslim inter-faith discussion) treat the Mahdi as analogous to the Antichrist, but this is controversial and not accepted in Islamic theology.

In both motifs:

• A global scale of rule is envisaged.

• A final battle or confrontation occurs (in Islamic version: often alongside the return of Jesus) EBSCO+1

• Moral transformation of the world is central.

Yet significant differences:

• In Mahdi doctrine the mission is restorative and righteous, not deceptive and evil.

• In Christian Antichrist doctrine the world is dominated by evil until Christ returns and defeats the Antichrist.

• The axis of “empire” differs: Muslim eschatology centres around Islam and submission to God; Christian eschatology centres around Christ and faith in him.

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Implications and Contemporary Relevance

Why does the idea of a global Mahdi-empire matter today? Several factors:

• Political: Some commentators (e.g., on Iran’s foreign policy) warn that eschatological beliefs about the Mahdi influence state behaviour, especially in relation to global missions or support for movements abroad. Boston University+1

• Ideological: The vision of a global Islamic justice order feeds into debates about “global order,” the role of Islam in world politics, and how religiously motivated movements interpret their mission.

• Inter-faith: The parallels (and differences) between Mahdi eschatology and Christian eschatology encourage dialogue—and sometimes tension—over the meaning of “end-times,” dominion, and what constitutes legitimate religious power.

• Sociological: For believers, the expectation of the Mahdi offers hope in times of crisis: the world is unjust now, but a saviour will come and transform it. periodicos.pucminas.br+1

However, there are also cautionary notes: the global-empire motif can be harnessed by extremist groups or conspiratorial thinking, projecting inevitability onto geopolitical events. Some sources warn of mis-use of Mahdist imagery for political mobilisation. institute.global

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Critical Assessment and Limitations

It is important to approach the “empire” narrative with caution. Some of the limitations:

• Many of the hadiths and traditions about the Mahdi are disputed or of uncertain authenticity. Islamic scholars often classify them into various degrees of reliability.

• The specific claim of excluding Makkah and Madinah from the Mahdi’s empire lacks strong textual support; it may derive from popular, non-canonical interpretations.

• The idea of a world-conquering empire is often symbolic rather than strictly literal: “filling the earth with justice” might mean moral transformation rather than military conquest. The interpretive diversity among Shiʿites means that some understand the Mahdi more spiritually than militarily. Islamic Center+1

• There is a risk of projecting modern ideas of global empire or state-power onto what may have been originally theological and symbolic visions.

• Scholars emphasise that eschatological writings were often composed in times of crisis and may reflect symbolic language rather than geopolitical blueprints. periodicos.pucminas.br

Thus, while the “Mahdi empire” motif is compelling in popular discourse, it must be situated within the broader context of eschatological literature and theological diversity.

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Conclusion

The vision of a global rule under the Shiʿite Mahdi—one in which the earth is filled with justice and the faithful are united—is a powerful component of Shiʿite eschatology. It resonates with themes of hope, transformation, and final victory over injustice. Within this vision, an “empire” is envisaged: dominion over east and west, over Muslims and non-Muslims, a profound change of world order.

However, the specific twist that such an empire would cover everything except Makkah and Madinah is not firmly grounded in the primary eschatological sources and may reflect modern or syncretic interpretations. The comparison to the “Antichrist empire” motif in Christian eschatology is helpful in highlighting the scale and intensity of the vision, but it also underscores crucial differences in purpose, character, and theology.

For believers, theologians, scholars and observers alike, the Mahdi-empire theme invites reflection on the nature of power, redemption, and the end of history. It reminds us that eschatology is not just about the future—it is about how communities understand the present world, its injustices, and their aspirations for what comes next.