The Shiites and Abu Lu'lu' al-Majusi: Martyr, Hero, or Assassin?

The early centuries of Islamic history were marked by intense political, religious, and sectarian upheaval. Among the most contested episodes is the assassination of the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, in 644 CE by Abu Lu'lu' al-Majusi—a Persian slave. The event is seen very differently depending on one’s religious or sectarian perspective. While the Sunni Muslim tradition overwhelmingly regards Abu Lu'lu' as a criminal and murderer, certain Shiite circles—particularly among extreme or folkloric Shiite groups—have historically commemorated him as a hero or avenger.

This article explores who Abu Lu'lu' was, the context of Umar’s assassination, and why some Shiites have regarded him as more than just a historical figure—but even a symbol of resistance or retribution.

---

The Historical Background

Umar ibn al-Khattab was the second Caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate and played a crucial role in expanding the Islamic empire. Under his leadership, Muslim forces conquered vast territories, including much of the Sassanid Persian Empire. This led to the capture and enslavement of many Persians, some of whom were brought to Arabia as slaves, including Abu Lu'lu' (also known as Fīrūz or Fairuz), a Persian craftsman.

According to Sunni historical sources, Abu Lu'lu' held a grudge against Umar for refusing to reduce the taxes imposed on him by his master, al-Mughira ibn Shu'ba. In 644 CE, he stabbed Umar in Medina while the Caliph was leading the Fajr (dawn) prayer. Umar died a few days later from his wounds.

Abu Lu'lu' was reportedly killed shortly after the attack or committed suicide.

---

Sunni View: A Heinous Crime

In Sunni Islam, Umar ibn al-Khattab is revered as one of the greatest companions of the Prophet Muhammad and a rightly guided Caliph. His governance, justice, and administrative reforms are praised, and his assassination is viewed as a tragic betrayal.

Abu Lu'lu', accordingly, is seen as a murderer, a Zoroastrian heretic (Majusi), and an enemy of Islam. His actions are considered unjustified, cowardly, and politically destabilizing. For Sunnis, there is no redemption in his deed.

---

Shiite Perspectives: A Complex Picture

The mainstream Twelver Shiite tradition—which forms the largest branch of Shi'a Islam—does not formally canonize or endorse Abu Lu'lu' as a religious hero. However, some Shiite historians and communities, especially those in folk or popular religious settings, have remembered him as a symbolic figure of vengeance against what they perceive as injustice perpetrated against the Prophet’s family (Ahl al-Bayt).

Why would some Shiites consider him a hero?

To understand this, we must first acknowledge the profound grievances Shiites have historically had with the early Caliphate:

• Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, is considered by Shiites to be the rightful first successor to Muhammad.

• The selection of Abu Bakr, and later Umar, is seen by many Shiites as a political usurpation of Ali’s right to leadership.

• Shiite traditions hold that Umar was among those who pressured and marginalized Ali and Fatimah (the Prophet’s daughter), and some sources even cite him as being complicit in acts that led to Fatimah’s death.

Given this context, Abu Lu'lu' became, in some popular narratives, a figure of poetic justice, not merely a personal avenger but an avenger of the Prophet’s family.

---

The Festival of Omar Koshan

One of the most controversial aspects of this remembrance is the now mostly abandoned Shiite festival called “Omar Koshan”, which was celebrated in parts of Iran, Iraq, and the Indian subcontinent, particularly by more extreme or folkloric Shiite communities.

• The festival was typically observed around 9 Rabi’ al-Awwal, a date some associate with Umar’s death.

• Celebrants would light candles, hold mock funerals, and symbolically curse or condemn Umar and other early caliphs viewed as enemies of Ahl al-Bayt.

• In some versions of the tradition, Abu Lu'lu' was honored as a hero or martyr who stood against oppression.

It’s important to note that mainstream Shiite scholars, especially in the modern era, have distanced themselves from these practices, seeing them as inappropriate, inflammatory, and inconsistent with Islamic ethics. Figures such as Ayatollah Khamenei, Ayatollah Sistani, and other prominent clerics have spoken against public displays of sectarian hatred.

---

The Shrine of Abu Lu'lu' in Kashan, Iran

For many centuries, a shrine believed to be the tomb of Abu Lu'lu' stood in Kashan, Iran, despite historical evidence that he died in Medina. The shrine became a site of pilgrimage, especially for those who saw him as a hero. Some visitors prayed for justice or expressed symbolic acts of vengeance against historical injustices.

However, the shrine became a focal point of Sunni-Shiite tensions, particularly after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, as Iran began to present a more pan-Islamic identity. In the 2000s, Iranian authorities closed the shrine, citing the need to reduce sectarian provocations.

---

Historical or Political Symbolism?

For some Shiites, Abu Lu'lu' is less a person than a symbol—a representation of the perceived crimes committed by the early caliphate against the family of the Prophet. His image has been mythologized, and tales about him defeating jinn, building miraculous structures, or standing up against injustice abound in folklore.

But this symbolism has been deeply controversial. Sunnis often see the veneration of such a figure as offensive and provocative, leading to backlash, tension, and even violence in some areas. Scholars on both sides of the Sunni-Shia divide have generally called for more respectful, united approaches to early Islamic history, especially as the Muslim world faces modern challenges requiring intra-faith cooperation.

---

Modern Shiite Scholarship: A More Balanced Approach

Today, most educated Shiite scholars and institutions do not endorse the glorification of Abu Lu'lu'. They emphasize that the actions of individuals—no matter how wronged—should be judged by ethical and theological standards, and that revenge killing or assassination cannot be condoned as legitimate Islamic behavior.

Moreover, modern Shiite thinkers are more focused on the values of justice, resistance against tyranny, and devotion to the Ahl al-Bayt, rather than on historical revenge. The Shiite ethos is centered on Imam Hussain’s martyrdom at Karbala, which has a much more powerful and unifying resonance than the ambiguous legacy of Abu Lu'lu'.

---

Conclusion: A Divisive Legacy

Abu Lu'lu' al-Majusi occupies a deeply polarizing place in Islamic history. For the Sunni majority, he is a tragic and condemnable figure who assassinated a revered leader. For some Shiites—particularly in older, folkloric traditions—he was remembered as a symbol of vengeance and resistance to oppression. However, mainstream Shiite theology today does not endorse his veneration, recognizing the importance of unity, justice, and historical reconciliation.

The story of Abu Lu'lu' serves as a window into the early fractures of the Muslim community and how different memories of the same events can shape identities, rituals, and politics across centuries. In a time when sectarian tensions still flare, re-examining such historical episodes with scholarly integrity, empathy, and critical thinking is more important than ever.

The Shiites celebrate the Day when the Second Caliph of Islam, Umar Al-Khattab was assassinated

Historical Context & Shi‘ite Perspective

In Shi‘ite tradition, ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb (d. 644 CE), the second Caliph after Muhammad, is often seen as one who wronged the Ahl al‑Bayt—particularly Lady Fāṭimah—by denying her Fadak and sanctioning actions against her household. His legacy is viewed as part of systemic oppression, which plays into Shi‘ite interpretations of early Islamic leadership and justice Wikishia+4Reddit+4Wikishia+4.

Abu Luʾluʾah (Firūz), the Persian slave who assassinated ʿUmar, is sometimes viewed in Shi‘ite folklore as having symbolically avenged that oppression. His act grew into a ritualized celebration in certain regions, especially Iran Wikishia+4Wikipedia+4Wikipedia+4.

---

The Festival: Omar Koshan (Umar Koshān)

Origins & Development

Omar Koshan (كُشَان), literally “the killing of ʿUmar,” became a Safavid-era Shi‘ite festival in 16th-century Iran, originally centered around Abu Luʾluʾah’s reputed shrine in Kashan. It was held annually on the Islamic date of ʿUmar’s assassination, though sources vary between 9th of Rabiʾ al‑Awwal and other days in Dhu al‑Ḥijjah sonsofsunnah.com+2Wikipedia+2Wikipedia+2.

The holiday was characterized by carnival-like celebrations, burning and beating effigies of ʿUmar, reciting cursing poetry, and subverting social norms in parody of established order. Over time, it evolved into a broader form of cultural protest against perceived injustice Wikishia+6Wikipedia+6Wikipedia+6.

Religious Framing & Symbolism

In Shi‘ite literature, the day of ʿUmar’s death is referred to as Eid al‑Zahra, Farḥat al‑Zahra, or Eidullah al‑Akbar—a “Second Ghadīr” or “Greater Eid”—marking divine justice and the vindication of Lady Fāṭimah’s prayer against oppression Wikishia+6gift2shias.com+6Iqra Online+6.

Sayyid al‑Nayṣābūrī in Taqwīm al‑Shīʿa described it as a day of rejoicing for prophets, angels, and lovers of the Ahl al‑Bayt, with recommended acts such as feeding the needy, wearing new clothes, perfuming oneself, and even taking a ritual bath (ghusl) Reddit+3gift2shias.com+3sonsofsunnah.com+3.

---

Decline and Contemporary Status

Decline During Safavids to Today

While Omar Koshan was widely practiced across Iran during the Safavid and Qajar eras, it gradually diminished with the rise of Pan‑Islamism and improving Sunni–Shi‘ite relations in the late 19th century. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian government officially banned the festival due to its sectarian connotations and provocative nature, especially its incendiary language and theatrics Islam21c+4Wikipedia+4Wikipedia+4.

Today, public observances are mostly discontinued. Some clandestine or private commemorations reportedly persist in parts of Iran, but not with the same scale or official sanction, and are discouraged by many Shi‘ite leaders WikipediaWikishia.

Opposition by Shi‘ite Authorities

Renowned Shi‘ite marājiʿ (religious authorities), including Ayatullāh Khamenei, Ayatullāh al‑Ṣiṣṭānī, Ayatullāh Bahjat, and others, have criticized or prohibited these ceremonies. They argue that celebrating violence—even symbolically—is counterproductive, ignites sectarian tensions, and strays from Shi‘ism’s core principles of justice and unity WikishiaWikishia.

Khamenei described certain acts done allegedly to “please Lady Fāṭimah” (i.e. celebrating oppression of ʿUmar) as contradictory to the goals of the Iranian Revolution. Sistani emphasized focusing on shared beliefs and avoiding provocative speech likely to incite division Wikishia+1Reddit+1.

---

Scholarly & Community Perspectives

Diversity of Practice

Not all Shi‘ites associate Eid al‑Zahra with ʿUmar’s death. In many Twelver communities—particularly outside Iran—the 9th of Rabiʾ al‑Awwal is commemorated for other reasons: the lifting of the angels’ pens, the imamate transfer from Hasan al‑Askari to the Hidden Imam al‑Mahdī, or the death of ʿUmar ibn Sa‘d, who led the forces that killed Imam Ḥusayn at Karbalā́ Wikishia+5Iqra Online+5Reddit+5.

As noted by some users online:

“Celebrating the death [of] ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb on the 9th of Rabiʾ al‑Awwal … makes no sense … I haven’t heard of people celebrating except among Shayrāzīs” Reddit.

Thus, the claim that Shi‘ites broadly celebrate ʿUmar’s assassination is historically inaccurate; it's confined to particular cultural–sectarian circles.

Online Narratives

Reddit discussions reflect that the ideas persist mostly within certain communities:

“This day is the day of happiness of the Ahl al‑Bayt … because the curse of Lady Fatimah … was fulfilled” — and described it as an Eid with recommended charitable and celebratory acts alwaght.net+9Islam21c+9Reddit+9Iqra Online+8Reddit+8Reddit+8.

Critics argue that equating celebration of oppression with loyalty to the Ahl al‑Bayt is misguided, and that Shi‘ism’s integrity lies in constructive memory rather than sectarian provocations.

---

🎯 Summary & Reflections

• Eid al‑Zahra / Farḥat al‑Zahra, sometimes held on 9 Rabiʾ al‑Awwal, originated as commemoration of the assassination of Caliph ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb and was practiced especially in Iran under Safavid influence Wikipedia+6Wikishia+6Iqra Online+6.

• This festival, known as Omar Koshan, involved carnival-style rituals, ritualized cursing of ʿUmar, and symbolic roles of inversion and defiance Reddit+4Wikipedia+4Wikipedia+4.

• By the mid-20th century, it fell out of public support in Iran and was officially banned post-1979 due to its sectarian rhetoric and potential for unrest Wikipedia+1Wikipedia+1.

• Many respected Shi‘ite authorities today discourage such practices, emphasizing unity, respectful discourse, and focusing on shared beliefs over divisive commemorations Wikishia.

• The belief extends only to specific subgroups; mainstream Shi‘a in other regions typically mark the same date for different theological and spiritual reasons, not the death of ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb Iqra OnlineReddit.

---

✅ Conclusion

While some Shi‘ite communities historically commemorated the assassination of Caliph ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb through the festival of Omar Koshan, this practice is neither universal nor mainstream among Twelver Shi‘ites. Rooted largely in Safavid-era Iran, the celebration has been officially discouraged and renounced by many contemporary Shi‘ite leaders, who stress intercommunal harmony and doctrinal restraint.

The Shiites condemn majority of the Companions of the Prophet, Muhammad as 'disbelievers'

Among the many theological differences between Sunni and Shiite Islam, few are as contentious or as deeply rooted in early Islamic history as the differing perspectives on the Sahabah—the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. While Sunni Islam venerates all the Companions as righteous and trustworthy, Shiite Islam adopts a more critical view. Indeed, it is often asserted—particularly by critics—that Shiites condemn the majority of the Prophet’s Companions as disbelievers (kuffar) or deviants. To understand this position accurately, one must explore the historical, theological, and sectarian dimensions that shaped it.

---

Historical Roots: The Crisis of Succession

The division between Sunni and Shiite Islam began not with theology, but with politics. When Prophet Muhammad died in 632 CE, he left no clear instruction regarding succession. The majority of the Muslim community (later known as Sunnis) supported the appointment of Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s close companion and father-in-law, as the first caliph through a consensus of the elders at Saqifah. A minority, however, believed that leadership should have remained within the Prophet’s family—specifically with his cousin and son-in-law, Ali ibn Abi Talib. This group eventually evolved into the Shia (from Shi‘at Ali, “the party of Ali”).

From the Shia perspective, the early caliphs—Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman—usurped a divinely appointed leadership. Shiites believe that the Prophet explicitly designated Ali as his successor on multiple occasions, most notably at the event of Ghadir Khumm, where he is said to have declared, “Whoever considers me his master, Ali is also his master.”

Thus, the conflict over leadership laid the groundwork for how each sect would come to view the Companions. For Shiites, many of those who supported the early caliphs were seen as having betrayed the will of the Prophet—and, by extension, the will of God.

---

Shiite Doctrine on the Sahabah

The mainstream Twelver Shia (the largest Shiite sect) do not reject every Companion of the Prophet. However, they do distinguish sharply between those who remained loyal to Ali and the Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet’s family) and those who opposed or marginalized them. This division informs a central Shia theological concept: al-Wilayah (loyalty to the family of the Prophet) is part of faith, and turning against them is tantamount to rejecting divine authority.

Key doctrinal points include:

• Belief in the infallibility (Ismah) of the Imams: Twelver Shiism teaches that the twelve Imams, beginning with Ali, were divinely appointed, sinless, and the rightful leaders after the Prophet. Anyone who knowingly rejected their authority is seen as opposing God's will.

• Rejection of the first three caliphs: Shiites hold that Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman—despite being close to the Prophet—wrongly seized power and marginalized the Ahl al-Bayt. Their leadership is viewed not only as illegitimate but spiritually harmful.

• Condemnation of certain Companions: Many Companions are viewed as having committed major sins by refusing to follow Ali or by participating in campaigns against him, especially during the Battle of Jamal and the Battle of Siffin. Figures like Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, Aisha, and Talhah are often harshly criticized.

That said, Shiites do not universally condemn all Companions. Some are held in high esteem, including Salman al-Farsi, Ammar ibn Yasir, Miqdad ibn Aswad, and Abu Dharr al-Ghifari—all of whom were staunch supporters of Ali.

---

Were They Considered Disbelievers?

One of the more controversial claims—often made by polemicists—is that Shiites consider the majority of the Prophet’s Companions to be apostates or disbelievers (kuffar). This accusation, while rooted in some early Shia texts, requires nuanced examination.

Classical Shia Texts

Some early Shia narrations (found in sources like al-Kafi by al-Kulayni) contain hadiths where Imams allegedly state that the majority of Companions abandoned the true path after the Prophet’s death. For example:

“After the Prophet’s death, all the people turned away [from the truth] except three.”
– (al-Kafi, vol. 8, hadith 341)

Such narrations were interpreted by some early Shia scholars as indicating widespread deviation among the Companions. However, classical scholars often debated the exact meaning—whether this meant literal apostasy, political rebellion, or theological misguidance.

Modern Twelver Shia Perspective

Contemporary Shia scholars and clerics are more cautious. Most avoid labeling the early Companions as outright disbelievers. Rather, they speak of “injustice”, “political error”, or “deviation from the rightful path.” The term kafir (disbeliever) is generally reserved for those who reject the fundamental tenets of Islam—not those involved in historical-political disputes.

Prominent Shia figures, such as Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini, rarely spoke of the Companions in such harsh theological terms. Instead, their focus was on promoting the rightful status of the Imams, not condemning others.

Thus, while some early Shia literature contains condemnations that appear severe, the modern Shia mainstream typically avoids blanket takfir (declaring someone an unbeliever) and emphasizes historical injustice rather than disbelief.

---

Sunni Response and Counter-Accusations

Sunni scholars have long criticized what they view as Shia disrespect toward the Sahabah. According to Sunni doctrine, the Companions are to be honored and trusted, and criticizing them—especially the first four caliphs—is considered sinful or even heretical.

Quranic verses such as:

"Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, and those who are with him are strong against disbelievers, merciful among themselves..."
(Surah al-Fath, 48:29)

and

"And those who believed and emigrated and fought with him..."
(Surah al-Tawbah, 9:100)

are interpreted by Sunnis as proof that the Companions were righteous and should not be criticized.

Sunni polemicists often use early Shia hadiths to claim that Shiism is inherently hostile to Islam’s earliest generation. However, this approach tends to overlook the diversity within Shia thought and the evolution of its doctrines.

---

Conclusion: Between Reverence and Rejection

The Shiite view of the Companions of the Prophet is not a simple matter of wholesale condemnation. Rather, it reflects a deeply historical and theological critique of what Shiites see as the betrayal of the Prophet’s family and the usurpation of rightful leadership. While some early Shia sources contain strong condemnations of many Companions, modern Shia scholarship has generally moved away from takfir and towards nuanced interpretations centered on justice, loyalty to the Ahl al-Bayt, and the necessity of divine leadership through the Imams.

In contrast, Sunni Islam holds the Companions in the highest regard, viewing their consensus as the foundation of the Muslim ummah. This disagreement—rooted in succession, leadership, and loyalty—continues to influence Sunni-Shia relations to this day.

Understanding this sensitive issue requires empathy, historical knowledge, and recognition that both traditions, despite their differences, share reverence for the Prophet and seek to preserve the spiritual legacy of Islam.

The Shiites Believe in Temporary Marriage (Nikah Mut'ah)

Nikah al-Mut'ah, commonly referred to as temporary marriage, is a practice recognized and legally permitted within Twelver Shi'a Islam, but widely rejected by the Sunni majority. This controversial topic has been the subject of intense theological, legal, and social debates for centuries. While critics often frame it as a form of legalized prostitution or moral laxity, Shi'a scholars and believers uphold it as a legitimate, Quranically-sanctioned marriage contract—one that offers flexibility and moral safeguards under specific circumstances.

This article explores what Nikah Mut'ah is, its origins, religious justification, differences from permanent marriage, and the Sunni-Shi'a divide surrounding it.

---

What Is Nikah Mut'ah?

Nikah Mut'ah is a fixed-term marriage contract between a man and a woman, established for a mutually agreed duration (which could range from a few hours to several years) and with a stipulated mahr (dower). At the end of the term, the marriage automatically dissolves—no formal divorce process is needed.

Key characteristics include:

• Consent from both parties.

• Specification of both time duration and dower.

• No inheritance rights unless otherwise stipulated.

• The woman must observe an iddah (waiting period) before contracting another marriage, typically two menstrual cycles, to prevent confusion over paternity.

While it shares some features with permanent marriage (nikah), such as requiring consent and mahr, it differs in duration, legal implications, and social expectations.

---

The Qur’anic Basis

The primary Qur'anic verse cited by Shi'a scholars in support of Mut'ah is:

“So give them their due compensation for the enjoyment [istamtaʿtum] you have had from them as an obligation.”
(Surah An-Nisa, 4:24)

Shi'a interpreters, such as Allama Tabatabai, argue that the term “istamtaʿtum” (from the same root as “Mut’ah”) refers explicitly to temporary marriage, especially considering how the early Muslim community practiced it under the Prophet Muhammad's guidance.

Sunni scholars, however, generally interpret this verse as referring to permanent marriage and claim that any prior allowance for Mut'ah was later abrogated (naskh) either by Qur’anic verse or by hadith.

---

Historical Practice in Early Islam

According to both Sunni and Shi'a sources, Nikah Mut'ah was permitted during the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime, especially during military campaigns when men were away from their wives for extended periods. The Sahih Muslim and other Sunni hadith collections mention that Mut’ah was practiced by the Companions with the Prophet’s knowledge.

Where the two sects diverge is on whether Mut’ah was later prohibited:

• Sunni View: Temporary marriage was allowed briefly, then prohibited by the Prophet himself, and later enforced by the Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab. Umar is recorded as having said, “Two mut’ahs were practiced during the time of the Prophet, and I prohibit them both: Mut'ah of Hajj and Mut'ah of women.”

• Shi'a View: The prohibition came not from the Prophet, but from Caliph Umar, and therefore lacks prophetic or divine authority. Shi’a scholars argue that Umar had no right to prohibit what the Qur’an and the Prophet allowed, and they maintain that Mut’ah remains valid.

---

Mut’ah in Shi’a Jurisprudence

In Twelver Shi’a Islam, Mut’ah is recognized as a legitimate form of marriage under Ja’fari fiqh (Shi’a jurisprudence). Leading Shi'a scholars such as Sheikh al-Tusi, Allama Hilli, and more recently Ayatollah Sistani have detailed its regulations.

Purposes of Mut’ah in Shi’a thought include:

• Preventing zina (fornication) by offering a lawful alternative.

• Offering flexibility to students, travelers, or widows/divorcees.

• Accommodating emotional and physical needs when permanent marriage is not feasible.

While the practice is religiously valid, most Shi’a scholars emphasize conditions, responsibility, and decorum, and many caution against its misuse or overuse. In Shi’a-majority countries like Iran, Mut’ah is legally recognized and even facilitated through the courts or religious institutions.

---

Criticism and Misuse

Critics—both Sunni and secular—argue that Mut’ah can be exploited as a cover for short-term sexual gratification, leading to abuse, especially of women. In practice, opponents claim, the system can resemble prostitution, especially when there is a power imbalance or when the arrangement lacks sincerity or ethical oversight.

Some Sunni scholars also argue that Mut’ah undermines the sanctity of marriage, which in their view must aim at long-term companionship, family-building, and social stability.

Shi'a scholars acknowledge the potential for abuse, but emphasize that any religious practice can be misused if done without fear of God or without adhering to the prescribed moral framework. Just as divorce, though permitted, is discouraged when done recklessly, so too is Mut’ah discouraged if it causes harm or violates Islamic ethics.

---

Sunni Alternatives: Misyar and Urfi

Ironically, though Sunni Islam prohibits Mut’ah, modern legal mechanisms have developed that serve similar functions, such as:

• Nikah Misyar: A marriage in which spouses waive certain rights (like cohabitation or financial maintenance). Practiced in parts of the Gulf.

• Urfi Marriage: An informal or secret marriage, often unregistered with the state, but witnessed and recognized under Islamic law.

These arrangements, while not temporary in theory, are often short-lived and discreet, leading some to argue that they are “Mut’ah in all but name.”

---

Contemporary Relevance

In today’s world, where economic hardship, globalization, delayed marriage, and social conservatism intersect, Mut’ah is both more visible and more controversial. In Shi’a communities, debates continue about how to modernize, regulate, or spiritually contextualize the practice to ensure it serves its intended ethical role.

Some contemporary scholars propose additional regulations or call for community-level education to prevent misuse. Others, including some younger Shi’a voices, are re-examining whether Mut’ah, though lawful, is appropriate in today’s social climate.

---

Conclusion: A Divisive but Defining Practice

The practice of Nikah Mut’ah is a deeply rooted feature of Shi’a Islamic thought, based on scriptural interpretation, prophetic precedent, and centuries of jurisprudential development. For Shi’a Muslims, it remains a legal, moral, and theological tool—not a loophole for immorality, but a structured, divine concession for specific human needs.

For Sunni Muslims, Mut’ah is a rejected relic of early Islam, seen as incompatible with the spiritual and societal objectives of marriage. Yet ironically, parallels in Sunni legal adaptations like Misyar demonstrate that the Islamic world continues to wrestle with the balance between law, desire, and ethics.

At its core, the debate over Mut’ah reflects broader questions about scriptural interpretation, authority, and changing social norms—questions that both Sunni and Shi’a communities must continue to address with honesty, scholarship, and a commitment to justice.

Ayatollah Khomeini and His Impact on World Shiism

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is one of the most influential religious and political figures in modern Islamic history. Revered by supporters and reviled by critics, Khomeini’s leadership fundamentally reshaped the landscape of Shiite Islam (Shiism), not only in Iran but across the Muslim world. His blend of theology and revolutionary politics gave Shiism a new global identity—transforming it from a historically marginalized sect into a powerful force with geopolitical reach.

Early Life and Clerical Rise

Born in 1902 in Khomein, a small town in central Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini was educated in the seminaries of Arak and Qom. A devout follower of Twelver Shiism, he became a leading marja' taqlid (source of emulation) by mid-century. Unlike many clerics of his time, Khomeini was deeply political. He believed that Islam had to be a guiding force not only in personal life but in governance.

His critique of the Pahlavi monarchy’s Westernization policies and secularism grew increasingly confrontational in the 1960s. The Shah’s “White Revolution” reforms, which included land redistribution and women’s suffrage, were seen by Khomeini as an attack on Islamic values and clerical authority. His vocal opposition led to arrest, exile, and a growing underground network of followers.

Velayat-e Faqih: A Revolutionary Doctrine

The cornerstone of Khomeini’s impact on Shiism is his theory of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), laid out in his 1970 lectures later compiled into a book. Traditionally, Shiite scholars had argued that political rule should remain in abeyance until the return of the hidden 12th Imam, the Mahdi. Khomeini overturned this idea by insisting that qualified jurists (faqihs) had a religious duty to govern in the Imam’s absence.

This was a theological and political earthquake. Khomeini was saying that not only could clerics rule—they must rule. This interpretation injected Shiite jurisprudence with political immediacy and served as the ideological blueprint for the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution

Khomeini returned to Iran in February 1979 after 14 years in exile (mostly in Iraq and later France), where he had built a transnational revolutionary movement. The Pahlavi monarchy collapsed in the face of massive protests, and Khomeini emerged as the supreme leader of a new Islamic Republic.

The revolution had profound religious implications. It was the first time in over a millennium that a modern nation-state was governed explicitly by Shiite clerics under divine authority. Khomeini was declared Iran’s Supreme Leader, combining religious and political power in a way unseen in contemporary Islam.

Global Impact on Shiism

1. Shiism Transformed into a Political Force

Historically, Shiism had been characterized by quietism, martyrdom, and political marginalization. Khomeini redefined it as a revolutionary ideology, placing it at the center of political change. He cast the Islamic Revolution as the fulfillment of Shiite values like resistance to tyranny and the defense of justice—values epitomized in the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala.

This ideological shift inspired Shiite communities in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Pakistan, and elsewhere to reimagine their roles within their own societies, often leading to greater political mobilization and, in some cases, confrontation with Sunni-dominated states.

2. Rise of Hezbollah and the ‘Axis of Resistance’

One of the most significant outgrowths of Khomeini’s vision was the formation of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah fused Shiite theology with military resistance, especially against Israeli occupation.

Hezbollah’s success—both as a militia and a political party—became a model for other Shiite movements. Khomeini’s Iran established what later became known as the Axis of Resistance, comprising Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, and various Iraqi and Yemeni Shiite groups, all united by opposition to Western influence and Israeli policy.

3. Clerical Authority Redefined

Khomeini’s concept of Velayat-e Faqih created a new hierarchy in Shiism. Traditionally, each marja' operated independently, and laypeople chose whom to follow. Khomeini’s model centralized religious authority within the Iranian state and made loyalty to the Supreme Leader a quasi-religious obligation.

While many Shiite scholars—especially those based in Najaf, Iraq, like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—rejected this model in favor of political quietism, Khomeini’s ideas gained traction in Shiite communities that felt politically disenfranchised.

4. Institutionalizing Shiism

Under Khomeini’s rule, Shiism became institutionalized at an unprecedented scale. Iran established seminaries, media outlets, charities, and military proxies that exported the revolution's message across borders. The Islamic Republic began sponsoring Shiite clerics abroad, thereby influencing religious education, community leadership, and political activism in Shiite diasporas from Africa to Southeast Asia.

Criticism and Controversy

Khomeini’s blending of religion and state power attracted significant criticism, even within the Shiite world. His detractors argue that Velayat-e Faqih undermines the pluralism and intellectual independence traditionally found in Shiism. Others point to the repression of dissent in post-revolutionary Iran as evidence of the dangers of clerical rule.

Moreover, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy—marked by regional interventions and support for non-state actors—has heightened Sunni-Shiite tensions across the Middle East. Many Sunni-majority countries view Iran’s revolutionary Shiism as a threat to regional stability.

Enduring Legacy

Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, but his legacy continues to shape global Shiism. His successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has preserved the core tenets of his vision. While some aspects of Iranian society have modernized, the fundamental structure of the Islamic Republic remains deeply rooted in Khomeini’s doctrine.

For many Shiites around the world, especially those in marginalized or oppressed communities, Khomeini’s message remains empowering. It provides a theological rationale for resistance, social justice, and political participation. For others, especially traditional clerics and secular critics, it represents a dangerous conflation of spiritual and temporal authority.

Conclusion

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was not just the architect of Iran’s 1979 revolution—he was the architect of a new form of Shiism. By turning a historically quietist religious tradition into a revolutionary, state-guiding force, he changed how Shiite Islam is understood and practiced across the globe.

His influence is evident today in both the geopolitical strength of Iran and the activism of Shiite communities throughout the Middle East. Whether one views his impact as positive or problematic, few can deny that Khomeini reshaped Shiism in ways that continue to reverberate through the modern Islamic world.