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Wednesday, October 15, 2025

Ibn Taymiyyah fought the Shiites of his era

Ibn Taymiyyah: Context

Ibn Taymiyyah (full name: Taqī al‑Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al‑Ḥalīm ibn Taymiyyah, 1263‑1328 CE) was a Hanbali jurist, theologian, and reformer in the Mamluk period. He lived through social and political turmoil: Mongol invasions, internal disorder, sectarian tensions, competing religious doctrines (e.g. different schools of theology, Sufi practices, Shiʿite presence in certain regions). His concern was often to define “orthodox” Sunni Islam (as he saw it), to oppose innovations (bidʿah), and to safeguard what he understood as correct doctrine, creed (ʿaqīdah), practice (ʿamal), and law (sharīʿah).

Part of his intellectual project involved confrontation with different sects whose doctrines he regarded as erroneous. Among them were the Shiʿites (especially Twelver Shiʿism, often called Imāmī Shiʿism), as well as various smaller or related sects (for example Alawites / Nusayris, Druze, etc., depending on region).


How Ibn Taymiyyah Opposed the Shiʿites

1. Theological Refutations & Polemical Works

Ibn Taymiyyah wrote several works specifically to refute Shiʿite theological claims. The most prominent is Minhaj as‑Sunnah an‑Nabawiyyah, which is a Sunni critique of a Shiʿite Twelver theologian, Allāmah al‑Ḥillī, whose work Minhāj al‑Karamah Ibn Taymiyyah opposed. Wikipedia+1

In these works, Ibn Taymiyyah challenged several Shiʿite doctrines, including:

  • The doctrine of the Imamate: who has legitimate authority after the Prophet, and what the nature of that authority is. DOAJ

  • Certain theological beliefs attributed to some Shiʿites about the status of Ali ibn Abi Talib, about whether some companions erred, etc., or whether some Shiʿite beliefs crossed the line into what Ibn Taymiyyah saw as shirk (polytheism) or kufr (disbelief). He criticized additions or exaggerations in Shiʿite creed from his perspective. The Authentic Base+2DOAJ+2

He insisted on strict monotheism (tawḥīd), adherence to what he considered to be the correct creed of the Salaf (early generations), and rejected practices or beliefs that, in his view, violated those boundaries.

2. Legal / Fatwās Calling for Action

Beyond theological refutation, Ibn Taymiyyah issued legal opinions (fatwās) in which he declared some Shiʿite doctrines or groups to be outside the bounds of Islam. In some cases, he called for confrontation — understood in terms of struggle or fight — against those groups.

  • According to historical sources, Ibn Taymiyyah described Shiʿites, in certain contexts, as worse (in terms of disbelief or deviation) than some other groups. EKB Journals+2Neliti+2

  • He reportedly issued a fatwa to fight Shiʿites in the region of Kisrawan (in modern Lebanon), particularly in relation to military action by the Mamluk state. The context involves the Kesrouan campaigns (Kesrawan = Kisrawan) under the Mamluks, during which Shiʿite communities there (often called the Kesrawanis) were subject to military campaigns. Ibn Taymiyyah is reported to have been involved in justifying or supporting such campaigns. EKB Journals

  • In addition, in his jurisprudential discussions, Ibn Taymiyyah sometimes classified certain Shiʿite beliefs as kufr (or disbelief), or at least gravely deviant, which could have legal consequences in terms of communal relations, non‑Muslim status, etc. The Authentic Base+1

3. Social and Political Dimensions

Ibn Taymiyyah's opposition to Shiʿites was not purely abstract or scholastic; it had social and political resonance in the Mamluk domains and beyond:

  • Shiʿite populations existed in parts of the Levant, notably Kesrawan (Nep via Lebanon), Gabal ‘Amel, and elsewhere. The Mamluks (Sunni rulers) saw them as potentially politically problematic — partly because Shiʿite communities often had different allegiances, sometimes looked toward other Shiʿite powers (though that is debated), and sometimes were perceived as needing to be suppressed or brought under control in religious terms. Ibn Taymiyyah’s theological positions could serve to sharpen the policy case for suppression. EKB Journals

  • Ibn Taymiyyah’s claims that Shiʿites had alliances or associations with groups seen by the sunnī establishment as heretical or as enemies (literal or spiritual) reinforced a view of them as not just theological dissenters but as social opponents. Neliti+1


Key Incidents: The Kesrawan Campaigns

One of the major historical episodes illustrating Ibn Taymiyyah’s stance in action is the Kesrawan (or Kisrawan) campaigns under the Mamluks.

  • The Kesrawan region (in modern day Lebanon) had a significant Shiʿite (often Twelver) population. Under various Mamluk rulers, military campaigns were launched into Kesrawan, often with severe consequences for local Shiʿite communities — loss of life, destruction, displacement. EKB Journals

  • Ibn Taymiyyah is said to have issued a fatwa and justification for such campaigns; that the Shiʿites in those areas were practicing beliefs which, from his perspective, were outside Islam and thus could be opposed by force. EKB Journals

  • These campaigns were lethal and destructive: many Shiʿites were killed or captured; their property was looted; many had to flee or were displaced. The Mamluks confiscated fiefs, redistributed lands; these campaigns are documented in contemporary chroniclers. EKB Journals


Controversies and Nuances

Ibn Taymiyyah’s opposition to Shiʿites is controversial, for many reasons. Some points of nuance:

  1. Extent of Takfīr / Accusations of Heresy
    Declaring someone a kafir is a serious matter; Ibn Taymiyyah is reported to have done so in certain circumstances. But scholars debate exactly which views or acts he considered to cross the threshold. Some of his criticisms are severe, but whether all Shiʿites were viewed as outside Islam in all contexts is contested. The Authentic Base+2EKB Journals+2

  2. Expressions of Respect for Ahl al‑Bayt and Ali
    Despite his polemics, some sources affirm that Ibn Taymiyyah expressed respect for Ali ibn Abi Talib and other members of the Prophet’s family (Ahl al‑Bayt), at least in certain respects. For instance, in Al‑Aqīdah al‑Wāsiṭiyyah, he says believers accept reports from Ali; or places him among the “best men” after the Prophet in a Sunni ordering. chiite.fr+1

    These kinds of statements complicate any simple picture of outright hatred; they show that Ibn Taymiyyah did not deny certain honors due to Ali or Fatimah, etc., but nevertheless sharply opposed many Shiʿite theological claims.

  3. Differing Views Among Shiʿites and Sunnis on Sources and Attributions
    Some of what is claimed about Ibn Taymiyyah’s statements comes from later sources, or from polemics. As with many medieval scholars, attribution of statements, the exact wording, and historical context matters greatly. Some alleged statements (especially about issuing fatwā to kill all Shiʿites, etc.) are debated in terms of textual attestation, context, authenticity.

  4. Political vs. Theological Motivations
    It is likely not only theology but also politics, security, social order, power relations, and fear of sectarian dissent played into Ibn Taymiyyah’s stances. Rulers often used religious legitimations for suppressing groups they considered dangerous. Ibn Taymiyyah’s role was partly as jurist and theologian, who provided such legitimization.


Scholarly Perspectives & Criticism

Modern historians, theologians, and sectarian studies analyze Ibn Taymiyyah’s approach, and there is a range of views:

  • Some see him as an uncompromising defender of Sunni orthodoxy, whose harsh rhetoric toward Shiʿites was normative for many in his milieu. They argue that Ibn Taymiyyah’s writings laid groundwork later for Salafi critiques of Shiʿism.

  • Others caution that while Ibn Taymiyyah’s criticisms are strong, they must be understood in historical context: sectarian strife was more fluid then; boundaries between sects were less rigidly enforced; local dynamics varied. Some of what we see in texts is polemical rhetoric meant to persuade or warn rather than purely descriptive of every individual Shiʿite.

  • Some Shiʿite scholars or writers accuse him of prejudice, of exaggeration, of misrepresenting Shiʿite beliefs, of mixing sectarian bias with polemical strategy.

  • There is also scholarly work that compares Ibn Taymiyyah’s view with contemporaries like Allāmah al‑Ḥillī (Shiʿite scholar), noting that Ibn Taymiyyah’s refutation Minhaj as‑Sunnah is in response to Minhāj al‑Karamah by al‑Ḥillī. That gives an example of theological‑legal debate: doctrine of Imamate, legitimacy, etc. DOAJ


Implications & Legacy

Ibn Taymiyyah’s fight against Shiʿites (in theological, legal, and occasionally political/military forms) had several lasting consequences:

  • His works continue to be cited among Sunni polemics against Shiʿite beliefs; they form part of the literature of theological debate and controversy even today.

  • Some later movements that emphasize strict monotheism, critique of intercession or of saint veneration, or that define Sunnī‑Shiʿite boundaries rigidly draw on him for justification.

  • On the Shiʿite side, his writings are often criticized, replied to; they have shaped how Shiʿite authors understand Sunni polemics; in some cases, they influence sectarian identities.

  • Historians of Islam see Ibn Taymiyyah as a complex figure: one who combined scholarship, activism (religious and sometimes quasi‑political), who sought reform according to his view of the earliest generations (Salaf), and who was unafraid to confront controversial issues — in his view, for the sake of preserving what he saw as true Islam.


Conclusion

Ibn Taymiyyah’s conflict with the Shiʿites of his era was multifaceted:

  • On the level of doctrine, he vigorously refuted Shiʿite theological beliefs, especially on Imamate, authority after the Prophet, and what he saw as innovations.

  • In legal rulings, he didn’t shy away from takfīr and calls for action in certain regions when he believed Shiʿite beliefs threatened or undermined what he held as orthodox Islam.

  • Politically and socially, his positions were part of larger Sunni‑Mamluk policies toward Shiʿite communities, especially in areas like Kesrawan, in which military campaigns, suppression, displacement, and persecution occurred.

  • Yet his views also included acknowledgments of the status of Ali and other Ahl al‑Bayt, which complicates simple characterizations of him as pure antagonist. His writings must be read in context: theological conflict, political pressure, sectarian identity, and crisis.

The story of Ibn Taymiyyah vs. the Shiʿites is not simply one of blind animosity, but of contested doctrines, of boundary making, of theology being weaponized (in the sense of political and social consequences), and of how religious scholars in medieval Islam both shaped and were shaped by the sectarian divides of their time.

Friday, October 10, 2025

According to Shiism, All Companions of the Prophet, Muhammad are disbelievers except a few

Introduction

The status of the Prophet Muḥammad’s companions (in Arabic, al‑Ṣaḥābah) is a core point of theological divergence between Shīʿī and Sunnī Islam. While Sunnī Islam generally holds that all companions who met the Prophet in faith are to be regarded as righteous (ʿadīl) and to be defended from criticism (except where there is extremely strong evidence otherwise), many Shīʿī scholars maintain a more nuanced view. Some strong formulations — often from polemical or extreme sources — may say things like “all companions are disbelievers except a few,” but among mainstream/established Twelver Shīʿī scholarship, the position is more differentiated.

This article explores:

  • What the mainstream Shīʿī scholarly positions are regarding the Companions, especially concerning righteousness, disbelief, or apostasy.

  • What the textual and historical bases for these views are.

  • The divergence of opinion within Shīʿī ranks.

  • The common misconceptions or exaggerations.

  • The implications of these views, and the controversies they generate.


Definitions: Who are the Companions

Before discussing what Shīʿīs believe about the companions, one must define who counts as a companion:

  • The Sunnī definition generally: anyone who met or saw the Prophet Muḥammad while being a Muslim (believing), even if only for a short time, and died as a Muslim.

  • The Shīʿī definition largely overlaps with this. Shīʿī scholars accept that someone who met the Prophet while believing, however briefly, is a Companion (ṣaḥābī). Islam Plus+3Al-Islam.org+3Wikishia+3

  • But Shīʿī scholars often emphasize sincerity, consistency in faith (i.e., belief not only nominally but in action and loyalty), and fidelity to certain principles—especially loyalty to the Prophet’s Ahl al‑Bayt (House of the Prophet). Some companions are praised highly; others are criticized or at least judged less favourably. Wikishia+3Al-Islam.org+3Islamic Message+3

So the question “are all companions disbelievers except a few?” depends also on how “disbeliever,” “hypocrite,” “apostate,” or “rejecter” is defined, and which companions are being referred to, and what sources are cited.


What Mainstream Shīʿī Scholarship States

From reliable Shīʿī sources (especially Twelver), the main positions may be summarized more moderately than the absolutist statement in your prompt.

  1. Not All Companions are Disbelievers
    Shīʿī scholars do not universally hold that “all companions except a few are disbelievers.” This is an over‑generalization. What is more accurate is that many Shīʿī scholars assert that among the companions there were:

    • Those who were faithful, sincere, and loyal (to the Prophet and later, especially, to ʿAli and the Ahl al‑Bayt). These are highly honoured in Shīʿī memory and considered righteous. Examples include ʿAli b. Abi Ṭālib, Salman al‑Fārisī, Miqdād ibn al‑Aswad, Abū Dharr al‑Ghifārī, Ammār ibn Yasir, Jabir ibn ʿAbd Allāh al‑Anṣārī, among others. Wikishia+3Al-Islam.org+3ShiaSunni+3

    • Those whose faith is considered weaker, whose actions were possibly inconsistent, or whose loyalty shifted after the death of the Prophet.

  2. Critical Stance Toward Some Companions
    Shīʿī literature includes criticism of certain companions, especially the first three caliphs (Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān) and certain others such as Muʿāwiyah. Some Shīʿī authorities accuse them of political usurpation of Ali’s rights, of opposing the Ahl al‑Bayt, or of other actions seen as unjust. In some accounts, they are described as having contributed to sedition (fitnah), deception, or wrongdoing. Islamic Message+2Valiasr AJ+2

  3. Concepts of Justice (ʿAdālah) and Excellence (Islah / Wilāyah)
    In Shīʿī theology, being a companion does not automatically confer ʿadālah (justice / uprightness) or permanent virtue. Shīʿīs hold that only the Imāms from the Ahl al‑Bayt have infallibility (ʿiṣmah) in religious and moral guidance; others—even if companions—may err, commit sins, or have lapses. Being a companion is a virtue, but not proof of perfection. Wikishia+2Al-Islam.org+2

  4. Some Strong Statements / Extreme Views
    Some Shīʿī scholars (especially in polemical works or certain historical writings) have made very strong, even shocking statements: for example:

    • The fifth Shīʿī Imam (in Twelver tradition) is reported in sources to have said: “People became apostates after the death of the Prophet, except three: Miqdād, Abū Dharr al‑Ghifārī, and Salman al‑Fārisī.” This is a famous narration among Shīʿī hadith collections. Islamic Message

    • Some sources declare Abū Bakr and ʿUmar as disbelievers or unbelievers in more polemical texts; these are not universally accepted as binding theology across Shīʿī schools. Islamic Message

    But these statements are not necessarily the mainstream or consensus position; rather they represent one end of interpretative and polemical literature.


Is “All Except a Few” a Fair Characterization?

Given the above, how accurate is the claim that “According to Shīʿīsm, all companions of the Prophet are disbelievers except a few”? It depends on what is meant:

  • If taken literally (i.e. almost all companions are unbelievers, only a tiny number are true believers), that is not the position of mainstream, classical Twelver Shīʿī theology.

  • If taken more loosely—as in many companions are criticized, some are revered, many are judged less favourably—then yes, that reflects something of the Shīʿī critique of certain companions.

So, one must differentiate:

  1. Hard polemical claims vs normative Shīʿī theology.
    Some texts make absolutely strong claims, but many Shīʿī scholars either reject those hard statements or interpret them cautiously (e.g. as hyperbole, metaphor, or specific to certain companions in certain historical contexts).

  2. Variation among Shīʿīs (Twelver, Ismaʿīlī, Zaydī, etc.) and among individual scholars. Not all Shīʿīs adopt the same views with equal strength toward every companion.

  3. Theological implications: Declaring someone a disbeliever (kafir), apostate (murtad), or hypocrite (munāfiq) has serious implications in Islam. Shīʿī scholars are often cautious, and many do not officially declare certain sunnī‑venerated companions to be unbelievers, even if they strongly criticize them.


Key Textual and Rational Basis for Shīʿī Views

What are the sources Shīʿī scholars use to justify their position?

  • Qurʾānic Verses — e.g. verses criticizing divisions, betrayal after the Prophet’s passing, admonishments concerning hypocrisy, etc. Some Shīʿīs interpret these as applying to companions who turned away or opposed what the “true line” (as they see it) after Muḥammad’s death. Al-Islam.org+2Islam Plus+2

  • Hadith literature — both Shīʿī hadiths and sometimes shared hadiths that they interpret differently. For example, reports that the Prophet or Imāms warned of companions turning away. The narration about “except three” companions (Miqdād, Abū Dharr, Salman) is a Shīʿī hadith. Islamic Message

  • Historical events — Shīʿī historiography often highlights events of political conflict after the Prophet’s death: the disputes over leadership, the first civil wars (fitan), the opposition of certain companions to ʿAli’s claims, etc. These become morally laden in Shīʿī thought.

  • Principle of Imāmah — central to Twelver Shīʿī belief is that leadership of the Muslim community after the Prophet was meant to stay within the Ahl al‑Bayt, particularly through Imāms divinely appointed. From this standpoint, companions who opposed that principle are seen as wrong, possibly sinful or worse.


Variations and Counter‑Points Within Shīʿī Thought

Not all Shīʿī scholars agree in how “harshly” to judge companions. Some variations:

  • Some Shīʿī scholars limit their criticism to specific companions, or to particular actions, accusing them not of full disbelief but of moral or political wrongdoing.

  • Others are more cautious, especially in modern times, avoiding statements that might be taken as labelling Sunnī companions as unbelievers, due to concerns of Muslim unity, politeness, or inter‑Muslim conflict.

  • There are also Shīʿī scholars who outright reject the more extreme claims (like “all companions except three are apostates”) or consider them weak in chain of transmission (ḥadīth criticism).


Criticisms and Sunni Responses

Among Sunnī Muslims, the Shīʿī view (especially its stronger formulations about certain companions) is often challenged on several grounds:

  1. Accusation of unjust generalization — Sunnīs say that many companions are clearly praised in the Qurʾān, in hadith, and in early Muslim practice; for Shīʿīs to reject them wholesale is unfair.

  2. Questioning sources or authenticity — Sunnīs often challenge the chain (isnād) or content (matn) of hadiths that Shīʿīs use to justify extreme statements.

  3. Theological and scriptural arguments — Sunnīs argue that many verses of the Qurʾān refer generally to “all those who believed among the Companions” in a positive way, e.g. “Allah is pleased with them and they are pleased with Him …” (Qurʾān 9:100) and others. They argue these verses contradict sweeping claims of widespread apostasy or disbelief.

  4. Avoidance of declaring large groups disbelievers — Sunnīs see characterizing large numbers of companions as unbelievers as problematic, both in terms of scriptural evidence and for community unity.


Why the Idea of “All Companions Except a Few” Persists

Several reasons why this strong formula appears in discourse:

  • Polemical literature playing to sectarian identities often sharpens statements for effect. Writers may use hyperbole or strong renditions to signal allegiance to the Ahl al‑Bayt and critique perceived injustice.

  • Simplification by followers / laypeople — complex theological positions get simplified, sometimes exaggerated, in popular belief or internet content, turning “many companions criticised” into “all except few are disbelievers.”

  • Certain hadiths / narrations in Shīʿī sources being cited out of context or without the commonist scholarly caveats (regarding reliability, chain strength, context, etc.)


What the Strongest Shīʿī Statements Are, & How They Are Interpreted

Some of the strongest statements are:

  • The narration that “everyone became an apostate after the Prophet except three (Miqdād, Abū Dharr, Salman).” This is widely quoted among Shīʿīs. But scholars debate its chain reliability, what “apostate” means here, and whether it refers to literal disbelief or metaphorical opposition. Islamic Message

  • Accusations against Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, etc., in Shīʿī polemical works: they are sometimes described as kāfir (disbeliever) or nāṣir of injustice. But many Twelver Shīʿī scholars stop short of declaring them unbelievers in dogmatic rulings, especially in more recent times.

Interpretive options used by Shīʿī scholars to contain or understand these claims:

  • Distinguishing legal apostasy from moral fault / political opposition / sin. Not all wrong actions equal disbelief in Shīʿī jurisprudence.

  • Using metaphorical, allegorical, or conditional readings: some statements may be commentary, or may refer to “in the sight of Allah” or in some future judgment, not legal verdicts in this life.

  • Emphasizing selective acceptance: only hadiths or narrations with strong authenticity are used; weaker ones are set aside.


Conclusion

  • The claim “According to Shīʿīsm, all companions of the Prophet are disbelievers except a few” is too strong and misrepresents mainstream Twelver Shīʿī theology.

  • Mainstream Shīʿī belief holds that there are three broad categories of companions:

    1. Those who were faithful, loyal, sincere, and among the “best companions”

    2. Those who accepted Islam and were companions, but were not especially strong or consistent

    3. Those who are criticized for hypocrisy, opposition, or betrayal (especially after the Prophet’s death)

  • Some companions are honoured, some are criticized; the Shīʿī position is selective, not wholesale condemnation.

  • But certain Shīʿī texts, especially older or more polemical ones, contain statements that seem to come very close to saying almost all companions outside of a small group are disbelievers or apostates. These are often debated, with dispute about whether they are to be understood literally or metaphorically, and whether they are weak or strong hadiths.

  • Because of the sensitivity of the topic — many Muslims (both Shīʿī and Sunnī) believe respect for the companions is important — views on this are frequently debated, sometimes heatedly, and sometimes simplified in ways that distort nuance.

Friday, October 03, 2025

Do Shiites Believe in Taqiyyah (Lying)? Understanding a Misunderstood Doctrine

In discussions about Islamic theology and sectarian differences, the term Taqiyyah is often mentioned, particularly in reference to Shi’a Islam. Critics have at times accused Shiites of practicing deceit through taqiyyah, claiming it is a doctrine that permits or even encourages lying for religious or political gain. However, this portrayal is often misleading and lacks nuance.

Taqiyyah is indeed a concept found within Shi'a Islam, but it is rooted in historical necessity, survival, and religious protection — not blanket permission to lie. To understand the concept fully, one must explore its theological background, historical context, and interpretations within Shi’a thought, particularly in contrast to Sunni perspectives.


What is Taqiyyah?

The Arabic word taqiyyah (تقيّة) comes from the root w-q-y, meaning "to guard" or "to protect." In Islamic jurisprudence, it refers to the practice of concealing one’s beliefs or identity when under threat, especially to avoid persecution, harm, or death.

In its essence, taqiyyah is not about deception in the usual sense of the word. Rather, it is about self-preservation when openly professing faith would bring harm. It is considered a form of religious dispensation, similar to how even in Christianity or Judaism, preserving life can override certain religious duties.


Qur’anic Foundation

The concept of taqiyyah is based on several verses in the Qur’an. One commonly cited verse is:

“Let not the believers take the disbelievers as allies instead of the believers... except if you fear them.”
Qur’an 3:28

Another is the story of Ammar ibn Yasir, a companion of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), who was tortured by the Quraysh and forced to renounce Islam. He did so verbally, though his heart remained firm in belief. When he told the Prophet what happened, the Prophet reassured him that God judges the heart, not mere words under duress. This is cited in:

“Except he who is forced [to renounce] while his heart is secure in faith...”
Qur’an 16:106

These verses are not exclusive to Shi'a Islam — Sunni scholars also accept these passages as allowing verbal dissimulation in cases of extreme danger.


Why Is Taqiyyah Associated More Strongly with Shiites?

While both Sunni and Shi’a jurisprudence acknowledge taqiyyah in principle, Shi’a Muslims historically practiced it more often, due to centuries of persecution by political and religious authorities aligned with Sunni Islam.

Historical Context

  • Early Shi’a Muslims were often minorities living under Sunni-majority rule.

  • Shiite Imams and their followers were frequently subject to intimidation, imprisonment, and execution for holding views that were deemed heretical or politically threatening.

  • The Imams themselves, such as Ja’far al-Sadiq and Musa al-Kazim, advised followers to hide their beliefs when necessary for safety.

  • During the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, Shiites had to conceal their allegiance to Imam Ali and his descendants due to state repression.

In such an environment, taqiyyah was not merely theological — it was a means of survival. It allowed Shiites to live and maintain their community and traditions without falling victim to political violence.


Taqiyyah in Shi’a Theology

In Twelver Shiism, the largest branch of Shi’a Islam, taqiyyah is seen as a temporary concession — not a general license to lie, but a principle that can be applied under specific, extreme conditions.

Key Features:

  • Permissible, not obligatory — It's allowed when necessary, but not always required.

  • Limited to threat or danger — It does not apply in regular interactions or to deceive others without cause.

  • Primarily about survival, not manipulation — It's about avoiding harm, not advancing political agendas deceptively.

  • Used defensively, not offensively — Unlike propaganda or misinformation, it is not about spreading falsehood for gain.

One famous statement attributed to Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq is:

“Taqiyyah is my religion and the religion of my forefathers. There is no faith for the one who does not practice taqiyyah.”

This is sometimes misunderstood as promoting deceit, but within context, the Imam was stressing that under persecution, concealing faith is not a betrayal — it is a protection of it.


Common Misconceptions

1. “Shiites are allowed to lie to non-Muslims.”

False. Taqiyyah is not about general lying to non-Muslims or even other Muslims. It is about concealing religious identity or belief when there is a credible threat. It’s not about daily interactions or manipulating others.

2. “Shiites use taqiyyah to infiltrate governments or deceive others.”

This is a conspiracy theory with no theological basis. Taqiyyah is not a political strategy for domination; it's a historical response to persecution. Most Shiite scholars emphasize truthfulness and transparency in public and private life.

3. “Shiites are commanded to lie.”

Taqiyyah is not mandatory in most cases. It is a permissible act under duress — similar to how even in Christian or Jewish traditions, individuals may be excused for actions taken under coercion.


Sunni Views on Taqiyyah

While often less emphasized, Sunni jurisprudence also allows for lying or dissimulation in extreme circumstances — particularly when it comes to protecting life.

Sunni scholar Imam Al-Nawawi, for example, in his commentary on Sahih Muslim, wrote that lying is permitted in three cases: war, reconciliation between people, and protecting an innocent person from harm.

In other words, both Sunni and Shi’a traditions recognize moral flexibility under duress, but taqiyyah became more prominent in Shi’a thought due to historical necessity.


Modern-Day Relevance

Today, most Shiites do not practice taqiyyah in their daily lives. In countries where Shiites are free to express their faith, they do so openly. In places where sectarian tension remains, such as parts of the Middle East, taqiyyah may still be practiced discreetly to avoid discrimination or violence — not unlike how religious minorities worldwide have sometimes concealed identity to avoid harm.


Conclusion: Taqiyyah is Not Deception — It's Defense

The Shi’a doctrine of taqiyyah is frequently misunderstood, often portrayed in bad faith as an excuse for dishonesty. In reality, it is a historically grounded, ethically constrained principle that permits a believer to hide their faith under extreme threat, much like other traditions allow for ethical flexibility when life or safety is at stake.

Rather than viewing taqiyyah as a license to deceive, it should be seen as a survival mechanism that allowed an oppressed religious community to endure centuries of hostility. It's a testament not to falsehood, but to the desire to preserve truth in the face of danger.


Further Reading:

  • Taqiyyah in Shi’i Thought — by Etan Kohlberg

  • Shi‘ism: A Religion of Protest — by Hamid Dabashi

  • Islam: The Straight Path — by John L. Esposito

  • The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology

Friday, September 26, 2025

Matam: The Physical Ritual of Mourning in Shiism

In the rich tapestry of Islamic ritual and spirituality, few practices evoke as much emotion, symbolism, and cultural expression as Matam—the physical act of mourning performed by Shi’a Muslims, particularly during the sacred month of Muharram. Far more than a public display of grief, Matam is a deeply embodied ritual of remembrance, solidarity, and devotion. It is a physical manifestation of sorrow for the martyrdom of Imam Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, who was killed in the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE.

For Shi’a communities across the world—from Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon to South Asia, East Africa, and the diaspora—Matam serves as a powerful expression of communal memory and spiritual identity.


Historical and Theological Foundations

At the heart of Matam lies the tragedy of Karbala, a pivotal event in Shi’a Islam. On the 10th day of Muharram, known as Ashura, Imam Husayn, along with 72 of his companions and family members, was brutally massacred by the forces of the Umayyad caliph Yazid. Refusing to pledge allegiance to what he saw as a corrupt regime, Husayn chose death over dishonor, forever becoming a symbol of resistance, justice, and unwavering faith.

For Shi’a Muslims, mourning Imam Husayn is not just an emotional response to historical tragedy—it is an act of spiritual solidarity. The suffering of the Ahl al-Bayt (the family of the Prophet) is central to Shi’a theology, and remembering that suffering is a way to draw closer to God, to uphold truth over tyranny, and to reaffirm one's moral and spiritual commitments.

Matam emerges from this religious framework as an embodied form of mourning. It is not merely symbolic; it is a ritual re-enactment of the pain felt by the Prophet's family and a physical offering of grief and loyalty.


Forms of Matam

Matam takes various forms, depending on cultural context, theological interpretation, and individual devotion. At its core, it involves striking the chest in a rhythmic fashion—often in unison with others—while reciting marsiya (elegies) or noha (lamentation poetry) that recount the suffering of Imam Husayn and his companions.

Here are the most common forms:

1. Sinazani (Chest-beating)

The most widespread and universally accepted form of Matam involves open-handed chest-beating. Participants usually gather in large groups, forming circles or processions. As elegies are sung or recited, the mourners beat their chests in synchronized rhythm, intensifying their movements as the emotional crescendo builds. This act is a visceral expression of grief and a sign of unity with Husayn’s pain.

2. Zanjir Zani (Flagellation with Chains)

In some Shi’a communities—particularly in South Asia and parts of the Middle East—mourning may involve zanjir zani, where mourners use small chains with blades to strike their backs, sometimes drawing blood. This controversial form is intended to share in Husayn’s suffering, demonstrating that no act of devotion is too extreme when honoring the sacrifice of the Imam.

While deeply meaningful to some, zanjir zani has faced criticism from within and outside the Shi’a community. Many religious scholars discourage it, emphasizing non-violent forms of mourning. In recent years, some countries have restricted or regulated this practice, favoring bloodless commemorations.

3. Qama Zani (Head-cutting)

An even more extreme form, practiced by a small minority, is qama zani, where devotees cut their foreheads with knives or swords. Like zanjir zani, it is rooted in the idea of sharing Husayn's pain, but it remains highly controversial and is often discouraged by Shi’a clerics and authorities.


Ritual Structure and Performance

Matam is typically performed during Majlis (gatherings of mourning), which take place throughout the first ten days of Muharram and culminate on Ashura. A majlis often includes:

  1. Recitation of the Qur’an

  2. Sermons (Khutbahs) about the life and martyrdom of Imam Husayn

  3. Noha and Marsiya recitations

  4. Collective Matam

In cities like Karbala, Najaf, Qom, and Mumbai, massive public processions are held, where entire streets are turned into sites of remembrance. Participants wear black clothing, walk barefoot, and chant slogans such as:

  • “Ya Husayn!”

  • “Labbayka ya Husayn” (“At your service, O Husayn”)

  • “Every day is Ashura, every land is Karbala.”

The emotional intensity of these gatherings is profound. Tears flow freely. Children, elders, and entire families participate. It is a time of deep collective catharsis and spiritual reflection.


Symbolism and Spiritual Meaning

Matam is not simply about mourning a historical tragedy. It is about bearing witness to the values that Imam Husayn stood for: justice, resistance to oppression, faith, and truth. By physically expressing grief, participants feel a connection to that sacrifice and renew their own moral commitments.

In this way, Matam functions as a form of spiritual protest. It sends a message to the world that oppression—whether political, social, or religious—must always be resisted, and that the blood of the innocent, like Husayn’s, will not be forgotten.

Matam also serves a pedagogical function. Young people who grow up participating in these rituals learn the stories of Karbala, internalize its values, and come to see themselves as part of a larger historical and spiritual narrative.


Contemporary Debates and Evolutions

In recent decades, Matam has become a topic of theological and sociopolitical debate, particularly in the context of modern sensibilities, public health, and inter-Islamic relations.

Internal Shi’a Discussions

Many contemporary Shi’a scholars advocate for “bloodless Matam,” emphasizing the symbolic over the literal. They argue that extreme forms of self-harm may distort the true message of Ashura and attract unnecessary criticism. Instead, they encourage service-based mourning—such as blood donation, charitable acts, or educational initiatives—as modern alternatives that uphold the spirit of sacrifice.

Sunni-Shi’a Tensions

In some regions, public displays of Matam have been a flashpoint for Sunni-Shi’a tensions. While many Sunnis revere Imam Husayn, they may view some Shi’a mourning rituals as innovations (bid‘ah) not found in early Islam. This has led to occasional social and political friction, particularly in areas where sectarian identity is politicized.

Globalization and the Diaspora

In Western countries and diaspora communities, Matam has adapted to new cultural and legal contexts. Processions may take place in public parks or community centers, and English-language marsiyas and nohās have emerged to connect younger generations. Some groups emphasize interfaith dialogue and frame Ashura as a universal call for justice, connecting Karbala to global struggles against oppression.


Conclusion

Matam remains one of the most powerful and emotionally resonant rituals in Shi’a Islam. Whether performed with quiet solemnity or fervent intensity, it is a deeply rooted tradition that transcends geography, ethnicity, and language. Through Matam, generations of Shi’a Muslims have kept the memory of Karbala alive—not as a relic of the past, but as a living, breathing call to conscience.

In a world often desensitized to violence and injustice, Matam insists that grief is sacred, that remembrance is resistance, and that the story of Husayn is not over—it continues in every act of devotion, every stand for justice, and every beat of the chest that cries, “Ya Husayn.”

Friday, September 19, 2025

Rajʿah in Shiite Theology: Resurrection Before Judgment Day

Among the distinctive doctrines within Twelver Shiite Islam is the concept of Rajʿah (Arabic: الرجعة), often translated as "Return" or "Return to Life." This doctrine asserts that a group of the righteous and the wicked will be resurrected before the Day of Judgment, returning to earthly life temporarily, to witness the triumph of justice and the divine fulfillment of promises.

Unlike the general resurrection (al-Qiyāmah) accepted by all Muslims on the Day of Judgment, Rajʿah is unique to Shiite thought, especially within Imami (Twelver) Shiism. It is deeply rooted in Shiite theology, eschatology, and the concept of divine justice (al-‘adl).


Definition and Core Beliefs

The word Rajʿah literally means “return.” In Shiite doctrine, it refers specifically to the return of certain individuals—both righteous believers and evil enemies of God—to life in the end times, but before the Final Resurrection.

The purpose of Rajʿah includes:

  • Vindicating the oppressed.

  • Punishing the wicked.

  • Allowing the Imams and their followers to witness the establishment of divine justice on earth.

  • Preparing the world for the return of Imam al-Mahdi, the awaited 12th Imam in Twelver Shiism.

Importantly, Rajʿah is not a general resurrection of all humanity. It is selective and temporary, involving particular figures whose return serves divine justice and fulfills eschatological prophecy.


Scriptural and Theological Basis

Shiite scholars derive Rajʿah primarily from:

  1. Qur’anic Verses
    While there is no explicit mention of Rajʿah using that term in the Qur’an, Shiite exegetes interpret several verses as implied references to the doctrine. Key examples include:

    • Surah Al-Naml 27:83
      "And [mention] the Day when We will gather from every nation a group of those who deny Our signs, and they will be [driven] in rows."
      Shiite interpretation sees this as indicating a partial resurrection—a preliminary gathering, prior to the universal Resurrection.

    • Surah Al-Baqarah 2:243–259
      Several verses refer to God bringing the dead back to life—for example, a group of people fleeing death, or the resurrection of Ezra (Uzair). Shiite scholars cite these as precedents that support the possibility of God reviving selected people before Qiyāmah.

  2. Hadith Literature
    Numerous hadiths in Shiite collections—attributed to the Imams—describe the return of past figures such as:

    • Imam Husayn (a.s.), who will return to avenge his own martyrdom.

    • The Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.), or at least his spiritual presence.

    • Other Imams and companions, as well as tyrants like Yazid and Umar ibn Sa'd, who will return to face divine punishment.

    These narrations form the core scriptural basis for the doctrine.


Historical Development of the Doctrine

The idea of Rajʿah emerged in early Shiite circles and developed over time, particularly under the influence of:

  1. Ghulat Sects
    Early extremist Shiite groups (ghulāt) sometimes proposed radical versions of Rajʿah, involving cycles of reincarnation. However, mainstream Imami Shiism rejected metempsychosis and reinterpreted Rajʿah within a more orthodox framework.

  2. The Occultation of Imam al-Mahdi
    After the Minor and Major Occultations (Ghaybah) of the 12th Imam, the belief in his return was closely tied to Rajʿah. It became an integral part of Twelver eschatology, marking the beginning of the final phase of history.

  3. Theological Systematization
    By the time of Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 1022 CE) and later Allama al-Majlisi (d. 1699 CE), Rajʿah had become codified in Twelver doctrine, appearing in works such as Bihar al-Anwar and Tuhaf al-‘Uqul.


Key Figures Expected to Return

According to classical Shiite eschatology, Rajʿah will involve both righteous and evil figures:

The Righteous:

  • Imam Husayn (a.s.) will return and rule with justice.

  • Amir al-Mu’minin Ali ibn Abi Talib (a.s.) will also return.

  • Possibly other Imams and selected companions, such as Salman al-Farsi or Miqdad.

The Wicked:

  • Tyrants and enemies of Ahl al-Bayt, including Yazid, Ibn Ziyad, and Umar ibn Sa’d, who were responsible for the tragedy of Karbala, will return to be publicly humiliated and punished.

In Shiite tradition, this phase is portrayed as a dramatic and symbolic reversal of history, where divine justice—denied in this world—will finally be seen and vindicated before all.


Relation to Imam al-Mahdi

Rajʿah is intimately linked with the reappearance of Imam al-Mahdi, the awaited savior of humanity in Twelver Shiism.

According to the doctrine:

  • Imam al-Mahdi will return from occultation to establish universal justice.

  • Rajʿah will occur during or shortly after his return.

  • Imam Husayn will be resurrected and entrusted with leadership, ruling in a restored and purified world.

  • The enemies of the Ahl al-Bayt will be resurrected to face judgment and retribution before all people.

Thus, Rajʿah forms part of a multi-phase eschatological process:

  1. Return of Imam al-Mahdi.

  2. Return of selected people (Rajʿah).

  3. Final Resurrection (Qiyāmah).


Philosophical and Theological Significance

Rajʿah reflects several key Shiite theological principles:

1. Divine Justice (al-‘Adl)

It affirms that ultimate justice must be visible in this world, not only in the afterlife. Many of the greatest injustices (like Karbala) occurred on earth; therefore, earthly vindication is necessary.

2. Exaltation of the Ahl al-Bayt

Rajʿah reinforces the centrality and sanctity of the Prophet’s family in Shiism. Their return affirms their divine favor and historical mission.

3. Symbolic Reversal of History

Rajʿah reverses the historical oppression of truth and righteousness, allowing wrongs to be corrected in public and physical form—not merely in a metaphysical or spiritual sense.


Controversy and Sunni Perspective

Rajʿah is not accepted in Sunni Islam, where it is often viewed as a Shiite innovation (bid‘ah) without Qur’anic foundation. Sunni scholars typically regard references to Rajʿah as metaphorical or spiritual, not literal resurrection.

Furthermore, Sunni theology emphasizes Qiyāmah as the sole moment of resurrection and judgment. The idea of intermediate resurrection before the Last Day is generally rejected.

Even within Shiism, some rationalist theologians (like the Mu‘tazila) in history expressed doubts about the literal nature of Rajʿah, preferring symbolic interpretations. However, the majority of Twelver scholars affirm it as a literal and physical event.


Modern Reflections

In contemporary Shiite thought, Rajʿah is still taught as a valid and expected doctrine, though its emphasis varies by scholar, seminary, or cultural context.

For some Shiites, it serves as a spiritual motivation, affirming that justice will ultimately prevail, and that no act of injustice will go unanswered.

For others, especially in apocalyptic or revolutionary settings (e.g. post-revolutionary Iran or Ashura commemorations), Rajʿah becomes a symbolic call to action—to await the Mahdi, to oppose tyranny, and to participate in the ongoing historical struggle for truth and justice.


Conclusion

The Shiite belief in Rajʿah—a resurrection of selected people before the Day of Judgment—is a rich and unique part of Twelver Shiite eschatology. It expresses profound commitments to divine justice, historical vindication, and the central role of the Prophet’s family in the unfolding of sacred history.