The Shiites Believe That the Original Quran Is Kept by the Shiite Mahdi

In the rich and complex traditions of Islamic theology, few topics evoke as much intrigue and mystery as the concept of the Mahdi, particularly within Shiite Islam. Among the many eschatological beliefs associated with the Mahdi, one that stands out is the idea—held by some within the Shiite tradition—that the original or complete Quran is preserved and will be revealed by the Mahdi upon his return.

This belief is often misunderstood or misrepresented, both within and outside Islamic circles. To understand it properly, one must first appreciate the Shiite concept of the Mahdi, the history of the Quran's compilation, and how Shiite theology diverges from Sunni orthodoxy on certain historical and eschatological points.

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Who Is the Mahdi in Shiite Islam?

In Twelver Shiism—the largest branch of Shiite Islam—the Mahdi is believed to be Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Askari, the twelfth Imam, born in 868 CE. According to Shiite belief, he entered into occultation (ghaybah) at a young age and has remained hidden from the world ever since. He is not dead but in a divinely protected state, awaiting the right moment to reappear and establish justice on earth.

Shiites believe that during his reappearance, the Mahdi will:

• Defeat the forces of oppression and corruption,

• Restore pure Islamic teachings,

• Rule with justice,

• And reveal hidden truths, including certain religious knowledge that has been concealed.

It is within this eschatological framework that the idea of a "complete" or "original" Quran being with the Mahdi emerges.

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The Compilation of the Quran: Sunni and Shiite Perspectives

To understand Shiite beliefs about the Quran and the Mahdi, we must first look at the history of Quranic compilation.

According to the Sunni tradition, the Quran was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad over 23 years and was memorized and recorded by his companions. After his death, during the caliphate of Abu Bakr and later under Uthman ibn Affan, the Quran was collected, codified, and standardized into the version we have today.

In contrast, early Shiite sources express skepticism about the integrity of the Quranic compilation under the leadership of those who, from the Shiite perspective, usurped the rightful leadership of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law.

Although mainstream Twelver Shiism today affirms the textual integrity of the Quran, historical sources indicate that some early Shiite thinkers believed that the original Quran—compiled as per the Prophet's instruction or by Imam Ali—included commentary, sequence, or interpretations that were excluded or altered in the Uthmanic codex.

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Imam Ali’s Codex and the Original Quran

According to Shiite traditions, Imam Ali compiled his own version of the Quran shortly after the Prophet’s death. This version, known as "Mushaf Ali", was said to be arranged in chronological order of revelation and included the Prophet’s explanations and possibly references to the wilayah (divinely appointed leadership) of Ali and his descendants.

Most Shiite scholars do not claim that Mushaf Ali had different Quranic content in terms of verses, but that it may have included:

• Additional tafsir (interpretation),

• Contextual notes related to revelation,

• And possibly references to the rights and status of the Ahl al-Bayt (the family of the Prophet), which were not emphasized in the Uthmanic version.

This Mushaf, according to Shiite belief, was rejected by the early political authorities and has since been preserved by the Imams.

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The Hidden Imam and the "Real" or "Complete" Quran

Shiite eschatology holds that this special scripture—Mushaf Ali or another original version or complete knowledge of the Quran—is now kept by the Mahdi, the Twelfth Imam. Upon his return, he will reveal this hidden knowledge, correcting misunderstandings and restoring the true interpretation of Islamic teachings.

This does not necessarily mean that the current Quran is viewed as false or corrupted by most Shiites today. In fact, prominent Shiite scholars such as Allama Tabataba’i, Ayatollah Khomeini, and others have explicitly affirmed that the Quran in circulation today is complete and unaltered.

However, the belief that the Mahdi holds access to a fuller, more esoteric understanding of the Quran persists in Shiite theology. Some interpretations hold that:

• The Mahdi’s Quran is not a different text, but a divinely inspired commentary and perfect understanding.

• It may also include scrolls or scriptures passed down from the Imams, such as the mysterious Book of Fatimah (Mushaf Fatimah), which is also said to be in his possession.

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What Is Mushaf Fatimah?

The Mushaf Fatimah is another esoteric text mentioned in Shiite hadith collections, said to have been dictated by the angel Jibra'il (Gabriel) to Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet, after his death. It is not a Quran, but a collection of divine knowledge, prophecies, and consolations.

Shiite traditions say that the Mahdi will return with this and other sacred texts, revealing their truths to the world. These are not seen as replacing the Quran, but complementing it with deeper knowledge and divine guidance.

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Misconceptions and Clarifications

The belief that Shiites think the Quran has been corrupted is a common misconception. While early polemical literature from both Sunni and Shiite sources includes accusations of textual tampering, the majority of contemporary Shiite scholars assert that:

• The Quran used by all Muslims today is the same.

• The belief in a “complete” Quran with the Mahdi refers to interpretive clarity, not an entirely different scripture.

• The Mahdi’s role is to restore the proper understanding and implementation of Islam, not to rewrite revelation.

Shiite scholar Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei wrote extensively on the integrity of the Quran, affirming that “the Quran present today is the same Quran revealed to the Prophet Muhammad.”

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Conclusion: Faith, Eschatology, and Hidden Knowledge

The Shiite belief that the Mahdi holds the original or complete Quran is part of a broader eschatological and theological framework in which the Ahl al-Bayt are the custodians of divine knowledge. The return of the Mahdi is not just about political justice, but about spiritual enlightenment — the unveiling of truths that have been hidden or obscured over time.

For Shiites, this does not negate the Quran used by Muslims today but complements it with a promise of future clarity and guidance. Like many eschatological beliefs across religions, this view is not grounded in empirical evidence, but in faith, tradition, and hope for divine justice.

Understanding this belief requires sensitivity to theological nuance and an appreciation of how deeply rooted it is in Shiite religious identity. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the doctrine, it reflects the richness and diversity of Islamic thought — a tradition still unfolding through both scripture and history.

Do Shiites Believe the Qur'an Was Altered by the Companions? A Historical and Theological Overview

The question of whether Shiite Muslims believe that the Qur'an—the holy book of Islam—was altered by the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad is one that often sparks confusion, polemic, and misinformation. At its heart lies a complex intersection of early Islamic history, sectarian rivalry, and differing theological worldviews. While some fringe views within Shiism historically entertained the idea of textual alteration (tahrif), the mainstream Shiite belief today—both among scholars and the lay community—is that the Qur'an has been preserved and is complete, just as in Sunni Islam.

To understand this issue properly, we need to explore the historical background, assess classical sources, and examine the evolution of doctrine among Twelver Shiites, the largest branch of Shi'a Islam.

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Early Islamic History and the Sunni-Shi’a Divide

The divide between Sunni and Shi'a Islam traces back to disagreements over leadership after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE. While Sunnis accepted Abu Bakr, a close companion of the Prophet, as the first caliph, Shiites believed that Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, was divinely appointed as his rightful successor.

This foundational dispute gave rise to long-standing political, theological, and legal differences. One of the most contentious topics historically has been the role of the Prophet’s Companions (Sahaba). Sunnis hold them in high regard, often seeing them as models of piety. Shiites, however, distinguish among the Companions, believing that some betrayed the Prophet's instructions regarding succession.

It is within this broader historical context that allegations of Qur'anic alteration surface.

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The Doctrine of Tahrif: What Is It?

“Tahrif” in Arabic literally means "alteration" or "distortion." In Islamic discourse, it refers to the idea that a sacred text has been changed—either by omission, addition, or modification. Christians and Jews are accused in the Qur'an (e.g., Surah al-Baqarah 2:75) of having altered their scriptures. But the question arises: has the Qur'an itself suffered the same fate?

Within Shi’a history, especially in the early centuries, there were indeed isolated figures who suggested that some verses had been omitted or changed by political opponents—namely the first three caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman—who are seen by Shiites as usurping the leadership that rightfully belonged to Ali. These early views, however, never became part of mainstream Twelver Shi'ism.

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Early Shiite Sources and Claims of Alteration

Some of the earliest Shiite hadith collections, such as Kitab al-Kafi by al-Kulayni (d. 941 CE), contain narrations that imply or suggest that verses referring to Ali and the Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet’s family) were removed from the Qur'an or altered. These narrations have often been cited by critics to accuse Shiites of believing in a corrupted Qur'an.

However, scholars caution against reading these texts at face value. First, early Islamic hadith collections—both Sunni and Shiite—include many weak, fabricated, or unreliable narrations. Second, some narrations in Shiite collections speak metaphorically or polemically, expressing frustration over the marginalization of Ali rather than making literal claims about the Qur'an's text.

It’s also important to note that these claims are not unique to Shiite sources. Early Sunni scholars, such as Ibn Abi Dawud (d. 929 CE), also documented variant readings and missing verses. The difference is that Sunni tradition largely resolved these discrepancies through the standardization of the Qur'anic text under Caliph Uthman, while early Shiites remained skeptical of Uthman’s role.

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Mainstream Twelver Shiite View: The Qur'an is Intact

Despite the existence of early narrations suggesting textual alteration, the overwhelming consensus among Shiite scholars today is that the Qur'an has not been altered. This consensus is not new but has been firmly established since the classical period.

Prominent Twelver scholars such as:

• Al-Murtada (d. 1044 CE) – A leading Shiite theologian, he explicitly rejected the idea of tahrif and affirmed the Qur’an’s preservation.

• Al-Tusi (d. 1067 CE) – Also rejected the notion that verses had been removed or altered.

• Allama Tabataba’i (d. 1981) – One of the most influential Shiite scholars of the 20th century, he defended the integrity of the Qur’an in his Tafsir al-Mizan.

• Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei (d. 1992) – Wrote an extensive treatise affirming that the current Qur’anic text is exactly as revealed to the Prophet.

These scholars argue that any narrations suggesting alteration are either weak, fabricated, or misunderstood. Moreover, they contend that belief in the corruption of the Qur’an contradicts explicit Qur'anic verses which state that God will preserve His Book:

“Indeed, it is We who sent down the Qur'an, and indeed, We will be its guardian.”
(Surah al-Hijr 15:9)

This verse is central to both Sunni and Shiite doctrines on Qur'anic preservation.

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What About Missing References to Ali?

Some critics argue that since Ali is not explicitly mentioned by name in the Qur'an, it suggests deliberate removal. Shiites respond to this in two ways:

1. Symbolic Interpretation: Shiite exegetes often interpret certain verses as referring to Ali and the Ahl al-Bayt, though not by name. For example, the verse of Wilaya (5:55), the verse of purification (33:33), and the verse of Mubahala (3:61) are all seen by Shiites as implicitly referring to Ali and his family.

2. Divine Wisdom: Mainstream Shiite thought holds that God deliberately did not mention Ali by name to test the community’s obedience. The Qur'an, according to this view, contains enough guidance for the discerning believer to recognize the rightful path, without undermining the principle of free will.

Thus, the absence of explicit names is not seen as evidence of textual alteration but as part of a divine plan.

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Sectarian Polemics and Misrepresentation

The accusation that Shiites believe in a corrupted Qur'an is often used in sectarian polemics, especially by hardline Salafi critics. These arguments usually rely on isolated narrations, taken out of context, or ignore the overwhelming scholarly consensus within Shiism.

It is also worth noting that both Sunni and Shiite traditions include hadiths with controversial or exaggerated claims, especially when compiled centuries after the Prophet’s time. The presence of such narrations in a collection does not equate to doctrinal belief.

Moreover, contemporary Shiite institutions, such as seminaries in Qom and Najaf, and major Shiite publications, all affirm the completeness and integrity of the Qur'an. Shiites use the same Arabic Qur’an as Sunnis do—without any additions or omissions.

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Conclusion: A Nuanced Reality

The claim that Shiites believe the Qur'an was altered by the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad is a misrepresentation of mainstream Shiite theology. While early Shiite texts include some narrations that imply textual changes—often reflecting political frustrations—they were never adopted as core doctrine.

Leading Shiite scholars for nearly a thousand years have consistently affirmed that the Qur’an has been perfectly preserved. The Qur'an used by Shiites today is identical to that used by Sunnis, and both traditions revere it as the unaltered word of God.

Understanding this issue requires historical nuance, intellectual honesty, and a rejection of simplistic sectarian narratives. Mischaracterizing the beliefs of others not only fosters misunderstanding but deepens divisions within the Muslim community. A more accurate, respectful engagement with the diversity of Islamic thought is not just an academic necessity—it’s a moral one.

When Did Shiism Separate Itself from Sunni Islam?

The division between Sunni and Shia Islam is one of the most significant and long-lasting schisms in religious history. Like the Christian-Jewish split, the Sunni-Shia divide was not a sudden break, but a gradual and complex process rooted in political, theological, and social factors. To understand when Shiism began to separate from Sunni Islam, one must trace the history back to the earliest days of Islam—specifically, to the question of leadership after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE.

The Succession Crisis After Muhammad's Death

The origins of Shiism lie in the question: Who should lead the Muslim community (ummah) after the death of the Prophet Muhammad? Muhammad died without explicitly naming a successor. This led to immediate debate among his closest followers.

One group believed that the leader of the Muslims, or caliph, should be chosen by consensus of the community, particularly the Prophet’s companions. This led to the appointment of Abu Bakr, a close friend and father-in-law of Muhammad, as the first caliph.

Another group, however, believed that leadership should remain within the Prophet's family—specifically through Ali ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law. They argued that Ali had been designated by Muhammad on several occasions, most notably at Ghadir Khumm, where Muhammad is reported to have said, "For whomever I am his master (mawla), Ali is his master." While Sunnis interpret this statement as a gesture of respect, Shia Muslims see it as a formal designation of Ali as successor.

The First Fitna (656–661 CE): Civil War and the Rise of Ali

The political tensions came to a head after the assassination of the third caliph, Uthman ibn Affan, in 656 CE. Ali was chosen as the fourth caliph, but his leadership was immediately challenged by factions loyal to Uthman, particularly those led by Muawiya, the governor of Syria and a relative of Uthman.

This led to the First Fitna, or civil war, within the Muslim community. Though Ali won some battles, he was ultimately unable to unify the ummah. In 661 CE, he was assassinated in Kufa by a member of the Kharijites, a radical group that had split from his own followers.

Ali's death marked a turning point. His supporters—now referred to as the Shiat Ali ("party of Ali")—began to form a distinct identity, emphasizing loyalty to Ali and his descendants as the rightful leaders of Islam.

The Tragedy of Karbala (680 CE)

While Ali's caliphate was a key moment in the development of Shiism, it was the events surrounding his son Husayn ibn Ali that solidified Shia identity and theology.

In 680 CE, Husayn refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid, the son of Muawiya and the newly declared Umayyad caliph. Believing that the caliphate had become corrupt and unjust, Husayn led a small group of followers to challenge Yazid’s rule. They were intercepted in the desert near Karbala (in modern-day Iraq), where Husayn and his companions were killed by Umayyad forces.

The Battle of Karbala became the defining martyrdom in Shia history. Husayn’s death was seen not just as a political loss, but as a cosmic injustice and a symbol of resistance against tyranny. Shia Muslims commemorate this tragedy every year during Ashura, a deeply emotional and spiritual event that underscores their distinct identity.

Theological and Doctrinal Developments

Over the following centuries, Shia Islam began to formalize its theology in ways that diverged significantly from Sunni thought.

Key distinctions include:

• Imamate: Shia Muslims believe that leadership of the Muslim community should rest in the hands of divinely chosen Imams, descendants of Ali and Fatima (Muhammad’s daughter). These Imams are seen not just as political leaders, but as infallible and divinely guided figures with spiritual authority.

• Number of Imams: The most prominent branch of Shiism, Twelver Shiism (Ithna Ashariyya), believes in a line of twelve Imams. The twelfth, known as the Mahdi, is believed to have gone into occultation and will return at the end of time to establish justice.

• Views on Companions: While Sunni Muslims generally revere all the Prophet’s companions, Shia Muslims are critical of some, particularly those who opposed Ali’s leadership or played roles in the deaths of Ali, Husayn, and other family members.

These theological developments gradually set Shia Islam apart, not only in terms of religious beliefs but also in ritual practices, jurisprudence, and spiritual outlook.

Consolidation During the Abbasid Period (750–1258 CE)

The Abbasid Caliphate, which replaced the Umayyads in 750 CE, initially came to power with the help of Shia sympathizers, promising to restore leadership to the Prophet’s family. However, once in power, the Abbasids sidelined the Shia and established their own Sunni-aligned rule.

During this period, both Sunni and Shia theological schools became more systematized. Sunni Islam developed the four major legal schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali), while Shia Islam refined the doctrines of the Imamate and jurisprudence under scholars like Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid and Al-Tusi.

Shia communities, though often politically marginalized or persecuted, continued to flourish intellectually and spiritually, especially in places like Kufa, Qom, and later in Iran.

Political and Sectarian Identity

By the 10th century CE, the separation between Sunni and Shia Islam was well established in both theology and communal identity. Shia dynasties, such as the Fatimids in North Africa (909–1171) and the Buyids in Persia (934–1062), began to emerge, ruling parts of the Muslim world and promoting Shia scholarship and practices.

The most transformative moment for Shiism’s political identity came in the 16th century with the rise of the Safavid dynasty in Iran, which declared Twelver Shiism the state religion. This made Iran the first major Shia state, in contrast to the predominantly Sunni Ottoman Empire to the west. From this point on, Sunni and Shia Islam were not just religious divisions but also geopolitical realities.

Conclusion: A Gradual but Profound Separation

The separation between Shiism and Sunni Islam was not a singular event but a gradual evolution that unfolded over several centuries. The initial disagreement over who should lead the Muslim community after the Prophet’s death planted the seeds. The martyrdom of Husayn at Karbala provided a powerful and enduring symbol of Shia distinctiveness. Theological differences over the role and nature of leadership (the Imamate), combined with social marginalization and political rivalry, deepened the divide.

By the early medieval period, Shiism had emerged as a clearly defined and distinct branch of Islam, complete with its own doctrines, religious texts, legal traditions, and spiritual practices. Today, the Sunni-Shia divide continues to influence Muslim societies worldwide—culturally, politically, and religiously—though both share the foundational beliefs of Islam: belief in one God, the Qur'an, and the Prophet Muhammad as His final messenger.

The Shiites Who Claim That Muhammad's Companions Are Disbelievers Can't Be Considered Muslims: An Islamic Perspective

Introduction

In Islamic history, the status of the Sahabah — the Companions of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) — holds immense religious and spiritual significance. The mainstream Sunni tradition views them as the best generation of Muslims, transmitters of revelation, and crucial to the spread of Islam. However, some Shiite sects have historically taken a very different stance, with extremist sub-sects even accusing many of the Prophet’s Companions of apostasy or disbelief after his death.

This article examines the Islamic theological response to such beliefs. It argues that those who curse or declare the righteous Companions of the Prophet as disbelievers fall outside the fold of Islam, according to foundational Sunni principles and the consensus (ijmā‘) of early Islamic scholars.

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Who Are the Companions (Sahabah)?

The Sahabah are defined as those who met the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ), believed in him, and died as Muslims. They are the direct students of the Prophet and were the first generation to uphold and spread Islam after his passing.

The Quran and Hadith honor them repeatedly:

“And the first forerunners [in the faith] among the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār and those who followed them with good conduct — Allah is pleased with them and they are pleased with Him…”
(Qur’an 9:100)

“Do not revile my Companions. By the One in Whose hand is my soul, if one of you were to spend gold equal to Mount Uhud, it would not equal a handful (of reward) of what they spent.”
(Sahih Bukhari & Muslim)

These texts show their elevated status, and to accuse them of disbelief is to question the integrity of Islam's earliest foundation.

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Shiite Beliefs About the Companions

While there are many branches of Shiite Islam, including Twelvers, Ismailis, and Zaidis, not all hold the same views regarding the Sahabah.

However, extreme sects, particularly within early Rāfiḍī Shia thought, claim that most of the Prophet’s Companions turned away from the truth after his death by not upholding the leadership of Ali ibn Abi Talib as divinely appointed.

Some go further, labeling Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and even Aisha (may Allah be pleased with them) as hypocrites or disbelievers — a claim rejected outright by mainstream Islamic theology.

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Why Such Claims Are Dangerous

These accusations strike at the very core of Islam. Here's why:

1. The Quran was preserved and transmitted by the Companions.

   • If the Sahabah were disbelievers, how can we trust the Quran’s transmission?

2. The Hadiths, the Prophet’s sayings and practices, were transmitted through them.

   • Denouncing them undermines the entire religious tradition.

3. The companions were praised directly by Allah.

   • To accuse them of disbelief after this divine praise is tantamount to denying parts of the Quran.

Thus, declaring the righteous companions as kuffar (disbelievers) contradicts clear Islamic texts and implies an accusation against Allah and His Messenger for choosing and trusting “false believers.”

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Consensus of Islamic Scholars

There is consensus (ijmā‘) among Sunni scholars that:

• The Sahabah are just (‘udūl) — upright and trustworthy in religion and narration.

• Cursing them, let alone accusing them of disbelief, is a major deviation and in some cases outright disbelief (kufr).

Imam Malik said:

“Whoever hates the Companions of the Prophet has disbelieved, because Allah has praised them all.”

Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal stated:

“We do not speak ill of the Companions of the Messenger of Allah... their hearts were pure, and their efforts for Islam were sincere.”

Ibn Taymiyyah wrote:

“Anyone who believes that all the Companions became disbelievers after the death of the Prophet is a disbeliever by consensus.”

Al-Qurtubi commented:

“The belief that the best of people (Abu Bakr and Umar) were disbelievers is itself disbelief.”

These statements show that the mainstream Sunni position regards such beliefs — when deliberately and persistently held — as incompatible with Islam.

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Who Are the Rafidah?

The term "Rāfiḍah" (lit. “rejecters”) historically refers to extreme Shiite groups who reject the legitimacy of the first three caliphs and curse them. This sect was denounced even by Zaydi Shia, who said:

“The Rafidah are those who hated Abu Bakr and Umar and declared them disbelievers.”

Even some moderate Shiites distance themselves from these views today.

However, classical Sunni scholars unanimously considered Rafidah beliefs about the Companions to be outside the pale of Islam, especially when coupled with other deviances like belief in divine Imams, distortion of the Quran, and calling for the destruction of Sunni teachings.

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Theological Implication: Takfir and Its Conditions

While Sunni Islam is cautious about declaring others as disbelievers (takfīr), there are boundaries. If someone:

1. Denies what is known by necessity in Islam (e.g., sanctity of the Quran),

2. Rejects the consensus of the Ummah,

3. Insults or slanders those whom Allah has honored, and

4. Persists in this belief knowingly and defiantly,

then such a person is not considered a Muslim.

So, a person or sect that openly curses the most righteous of the Prophet’s companions and accuses them of disbelief, knowing the praise Allah gave them, is considered by the majority of scholars to have left Islam.

This is not due to sectarian rivalry, but due to the core contradiction such beliefs have with Islam's foundational teachings.

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Clarification: Not All Shiites Are Disbelievers

It is important to distinguish:

• Ordinary Shiites, many of whom do not hold extreme views about the companions or are unaware of their historical implications,

• Versus extremist sects that systematically accuse the Companions of disbelief, reject the Quran's transmission, and ascribe divine qualities to the Imams.

Sunni scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah and Al-Ghazali acknowledged this distinction, and stressed that not every Shiite is a disbeliever, but those who curse or anathematize the Sahabah — especially the foremost ones — are committing kufr.

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Conclusion

Belief in the righteousness of the Sahabah is an essential part of Islamic creed. Any group or individual that accuses the rightly guided companions of the Prophet (especially Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali) of disbelief after clear divine praise and prophetic confirmation, is not adhering to Islam, according to the consensus of classical Sunni scholars.

While Islam promotes compassion, dialogue, and avoiding takfīr recklessly, core doctrines cannot be compromised. Respect for the Companions is not a trivial matter — it is tied to the preservation of revelation, the authenticity of Hadith, and ultimately, the credibility of the entire religion.

Therefore, those who insist that the Companions of the Prophet (ﷺ) — who were praised by Allah — were disbelievers, cannot be considered Muslims, as their belief contradicts the very foundation of Islam itself.

Sunni-Shi'a Tensions: Disbelief and the Status of the Companions

The Sunni and Shi’a branches of Islam, despite sharing the same Qur'an and core tenets of faith, have significant theological differences. One of the most contentious issues is the Shi'a view of some of the Prophet Muhammad's Companions (Sahaba) and how that view has historically affected Sunni perceptions of Shiism.

Among some Sunni scholars and movements, Shi’ites—particularly certain Shi’a sects—have been labeled as disbelievers (kuffar). A common justification is that some Shi’a groups accuse prominent Companions of betrayal or apostasy, which Sunnis consider tantamount to rejecting the foundations of Islam. However, this view is not universally held, and many Sunni scholars have refrained from making such takfir (excommunication).

This article explores why some Sunnis have historically regarded Shi’ites as disbelievers based on their views of the Prophet’s Companions, and how this theological rift has evolved.

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1. Who Are the Companions?

In Sunni Islam, the Sahaba (companions) of the Prophet Muhammad are revered as the best generation of Muslims. Their loyalty, sacrifices, and transmission of Islamic knowledge make them pivotal to the Sunni understanding of Islam.

Sunni theology generally holds that all of the Companions were upright and just, and criticizing them—especially the first four caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali)—is seen as an attack on Islam itself. The Qur'an praises the Prophet’s Companions in several verses, such as:

“Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah; and those who are with him are severe against disbelievers, and merciful among themselves...” (Qur’an 48:29)

Thus, respect for the Sahaba is a doctrinal pillar in Sunni Islam.

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2. Shi’a Perspective on the Companions

Shi’ism developed partly out of political and theological disagreements over who should lead the Muslim community after the Prophet’s death. While Sunnis accepted Abu Bakr as the first caliph, Shi’ites believe that Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, was divinely appointed as his rightful successor.

This disagreement led to vastly different historical narratives:

• Many Twelver Shi’ites believe that most of the Sahaba betrayed the Prophet’s instructions by not supporting Ali.

• Some early Shi’a texts described key Companions—including Abu Bakr and Umar—in extremely negative terms, even accusing them of hypocrisy or usurpation.

• Certain extremist Shi’a sects, such as the now-extinct Ghulat, went so far as to curse or anathematize many Companions.

However, not all Shi’a groups hold the same views. Today, mainstream Twelver Shi’ism (the dominant branch) respects some Companions, including Salman al-Farsi, Miqdad, and Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, whom they believe remained loyal to Ali.

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3. Why Some Sunnis View Shi’ites as Disbelievers

For many Sunni scholars, denying the uprightness of the Sahaba—or accusing them of betrayal or apostasy—is seen as denying part of the religion itself. This is particularly sensitive because:

• The Qur’an and Hadith were transmitted through the Sahaba. If their trustworthiness is denied, it calls into question the authenticity of the religion itself.

• Accusing major Companions like Abu Bakr and Umar—who played central roles in early Islamic history—of kufr (disbelief) is seen by some Sunnis as indirectly accusing the Prophet of poor judgment in choosing companions and leaders.

As a result, some Sunni theologians historically issued fatwas declaring certain Shi’a sects as disbelievers. For example:

• Ibn Taymiyyah, a 14th-century Sunni scholar, harshly criticized extreme Shi’a sects and labeled them outside the fold of Islam.

• The Wahhabi movement in the 18th and 19th centuries, under Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, viewed Shi’ism—especially practices like grave visitation and calling on the Imams—as idolatrous and heretical.

However, it’s important to understand that Sunni scholars are not unanimous in this takfir. Many distinguished scholars, including:

• Imam al-Ghazali

• Imam al-Shafi’i

• Shah Waliullah Dehlawi

—opposed declaring Shi’ites as disbelievers. They argued that while Shi’a theology was misguided or even heretical, it did not always amount to outright kufr.

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4. Differentiating Between Sects and Beliefs

Sunni scholars historically differentiated between:

• Rafidah (extremist Shi’a sects): These groups curse the Companions, reject the Qur’an’s compilation, and sometimes hold esoteric beliefs about the Imams. They were more likely to be labeled kuffar.

• Zaydi or moderate Twelvers: These groups express disagreement with some Companions but do not curse them or deny the Qur’an. Most Sunni scholars did not excommunicate these groups.

Today, mainstream Twelver Shi’ites (e.g. in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon) do not reject the Qur’an, believe in one God, accept Muhammad as the last prophet, and pray toward the Kaaba. These shared fundamentals lead many modern Sunni scholars to recognize them as Muslims, despite theological differences.

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5. Modern Sunni and Shi’a Interactions

In the 20th and 21st centuries, efforts have been made to reduce sectarian takfir:

• Al-Azhar University in Egypt, a major Sunni institution, under Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltut, issued a fatwa in the 1950s recognizing Twelver Shi’ism as a legitimate school of thought.

• The Amman Message (2004), endorsed by over 200 leading scholars from across the Muslim world, affirmed that Shi’a (Twelvers and Zaydis) are part of Islam, and that takfir should not be issued lightly.

Still, political conflicts—like the Syrian civil war, the Saudi-Iran rivalry, and sectarian violence in Iraq—have exacerbated religious divisions. In these contexts, theological accusations such as labeling Shi’ites as disbelievers often serve political agendas more than genuine religious concerns.

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6. A Call for Nuance and Respect

While it is true that some Sunnis have historically considered Shi’ites disbelievers because of their stance toward the Companions, it is equally true that:

• This view is not universal.

• Many modern Sunni scholars reject such sweeping generalizations.

• Shi’ite theology itself is diverse, and not all Shi’ites curse or reject the Companions.

In a time when sectarian strife continues to cost lives, responsible scholarship and interfaith understanding are essential. Reducing complex theological disagreements to accusations of kufr only deepens the divide and distracts from the shared values at the heart of Islam.

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Conclusion

The claim that Shi’ites are disbelievers in the eyes of Sunnis because they view some of the Prophet’s Companions as disbelievers is partially true from a historical and theological perspective—but only within specific contexts and sects. It does not represent a unified Sunni position, and many respected scholars have explicitly opposed blanket takfir of Shi’a Muslims.

Intra-Muslim theological disagreements, though significant, must be approached with nuance, historical literacy, and a commitment to peace and unity. Both Sunnis and Shi’ites affirm the oneness of God, the finality of prophethood, the truth of the Qur’an, and the importance of prayer, charity, and morality. These shared pillars offer a foundation for respectful dialogue—even amidst deep-rooted differences.

The Shiites and Abu Lu'lu' al-Majusi: Martyr, Hero, or Assassin?

The early centuries of Islamic history were marked by intense political, religious, and sectarian upheaval. Among the most contested episodes is the assassination of the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, in 644 CE by Abu Lu'lu' al-Majusi—a Persian slave. The event is seen very differently depending on one’s religious or sectarian perspective. While the Sunni Muslim tradition overwhelmingly regards Abu Lu'lu' as a criminal and murderer, certain Shiite circles—particularly among extreme or folkloric Shiite groups—have historically commemorated him as a hero or avenger.

This article explores who Abu Lu'lu' was, the context of Umar’s assassination, and why some Shiites have regarded him as more than just a historical figure—but even a symbol of resistance or retribution.

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The Historical Background

Umar ibn al-Khattab was the second Caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate and played a crucial role in expanding the Islamic empire. Under his leadership, Muslim forces conquered vast territories, including much of the Sassanid Persian Empire. This led to the capture and enslavement of many Persians, some of whom were brought to Arabia as slaves, including Abu Lu'lu' (also known as Fīrūz or Fairuz), a Persian craftsman.

According to Sunni historical sources, Abu Lu'lu' held a grudge against Umar for refusing to reduce the taxes imposed on him by his master, al-Mughira ibn Shu'ba. In 644 CE, he stabbed Umar in Medina while the Caliph was leading the Fajr (dawn) prayer. Umar died a few days later from his wounds.

Abu Lu'lu' was reportedly killed shortly after the attack or committed suicide.

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Sunni View: A Heinous Crime

In Sunni Islam, Umar ibn al-Khattab is revered as one of the greatest companions of the Prophet Muhammad and a rightly guided Caliph. His governance, justice, and administrative reforms are praised, and his assassination is viewed as a tragic betrayal.

Abu Lu'lu', accordingly, is seen as a murderer, a Zoroastrian heretic (Majusi), and an enemy of Islam. His actions are considered unjustified, cowardly, and politically destabilizing. For Sunnis, there is no redemption in his deed.

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Shiite Perspectives: A Complex Picture

The mainstream Twelver Shiite tradition—which forms the largest branch of Shi'a Islam—does not formally canonize or endorse Abu Lu'lu' as a religious hero. However, some Shiite historians and communities, especially those in folk or popular religious settings, have remembered him as a symbolic figure of vengeance against what they perceive as injustice perpetrated against the Prophet’s family (Ahl al-Bayt).

Why would some Shiites consider him a hero?

To understand this, we must first acknowledge the profound grievances Shiites have historically had with the early Caliphate:

• Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, is considered by Shiites to be the rightful first successor to Muhammad.

• The selection of Abu Bakr, and later Umar, is seen by many Shiites as a political usurpation of Ali’s right to leadership.

• Shiite traditions hold that Umar was among those who pressured and marginalized Ali and Fatimah (the Prophet’s daughter), and some sources even cite him as being complicit in acts that led to Fatimah’s death.

Given this context, Abu Lu'lu' became, in some popular narratives, a figure of poetic justice, not merely a personal avenger but an avenger of the Prophet’s family.

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The Festival of Omar Koshan

One of the most controversial aspects of this remembrance is the now mostly abandoned Shiite festival called “Omar Koshan”, which was celebrated in parts of Iran, Iraq, and the Indian subcontinent, particularly by more extreme or folkloric Shiite communities.

• The festival was typically observed around 9 Rabi’ al-Awwal, a date some associate with Umar’s death.

• Celebrants would light candles, hold mock funerals, and symbolically curse or condemn Umar and other early caliphs viewed as enemies of Ahl al-Bayt.

• In some versions of the tradition, Abu Lu'lu' was honored as a hero or martyr who stood against oppression.

It’s important to note that mainstream Shiite scholars, especially in the modern era, have distanced themselves from these practices, seeing them as inappropriate, inflammatory, and inconsistent with Islamic ethics. Figures such as Ayatollah Khamenei, Ayatollah Sistani, and other prominent clerics have spoken against public displays of sectarian hatred.

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The Shrine of Abu Lu'lu' in Kashan, Iran

For many centuries, a shrine believed to be the tomb of Abu Lu'lu' stood in Kashan, Iran, despite historical evidence that he died in Medina. The shrine became a site of pilgrimage, especially for those who saw him as a hero. Some visitors prayed for justice or expressed symbolic acts of vengeance against historical injustices.

However, the shrine became a focal point of Sunni-Shiite tensions, particularly after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, as Iran began to present a more pan-Islamic identity. In the 2000s, Iranian authorities closed the shrine, citing the need to reduce sectarian provocations.

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Historical or Political Symbolism?

For some Shiites, Abu Lu'lu' is less a person than a symbol—a representation of the perceived crimes committed by the early caliphate against the family of the Prophet. His image has been mythologized, and tales about him defeating jinn, building miraculous structures, or standing up against injustice abound in folklore.

But this symbolism has been deeply controversial. Sunnis often see the veneration of such a figure as offensive and provocative, leading to backlash, tension, and even violence in some areas. Scholars on both sides of the Sunni-Shia divide have generally called for more respectful, united approaches to early Islamic history, especially as the Muslim world faces modern challenges requiring intra-faith cooperation.

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Modern Shiite Scholarship: A More Balanced Approach

Today, most educated Shiite scholars and institutions do not endorse the glorification of Abu Lu'lu'. They emphasize that the actions of individuals—no matter how wronged—should be judged by ethical and theological standards, and that revenge killing or assassination cannot be condoned as legitimate Islamic behavior.

Moreover, modern Shiite thinkers are more focused on the values of justice, resistance against tyranny, and devotion to the Ahl al-Bayt, rather than on historical revenge. The Shiite ethos is centered on Imam Hussain’s martyrdom at Karbala, which has a much more powerful and unifying resonance than the ambiguous legacy of Abu Lu'lu'.

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Conclusion: A Divisive Legacy

Abu Lu'lu' al-Majusi occupies a deeply polarizing place in Islamic history. For the Sunni majority, he is a tragic and condemnable figure who assassinated a revered leader. For some Shiites—particularly in older, folkloric traditions—he was remembered as a symbol of vengeance and resistance to oppression. However, mainstream Shiite theology today does not endorse his veneration, recognizing the importance of unity, justice, and historical reconciliation.

The story of Abu Lu'lu' serves as a window into the early fractures of the Muslim community and how different memories of the same events can shape identities, rituals, and politics across centuries. In a time when sectarian tensions still flare, re-examining such historical episodes with scholarly integrity, empathy, and critical thinking is more important than ever.

The Shiites celebrate the Day when the Second Caliph of Islam, Umar Al-Khattab was assassinated

Historical Context & Shi‘ite Perspective

In Shi‘ite tradition, ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb (d. 644 CE), the second Caliph after Muhammad, is often seen as one who wronged the Ahl al‑Bayt—particularly Lady Fāṭimah—by denying her Fadak and sanctioning actions against her household. His legacy is viewed as part of systemic oppression, which plays into Shi‘ite interpretations of early Islamic leadership and justice Wikishia+4Reddit+4Wikishia+4.

Abu Luʾluʾah (Firūz), the Persian slave who assassinated ʿUmar, is sometimes viewed in Shi‘ite folklore as having symbolically avenged that oppression. His act grew into a ritualized celebration in certain regions, especially Iran Wikishia+4Wikipedia+4Wikipedia+4.

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The Festival: Omar Koshan (Umar Koshān)

Origins & Development

Omar Koshan (كُشَان), literally “the killing of ʿUmar,” became a Safavid-era Shi‘ite festival in 16th-century Iran, originally centered around Abu Luʾluʾah’s reputed shrine in Kashan. It was held annually on the Islamic date of ʿUmar’s assassination, though sources vary between 9th of Rabiʾ al‑Awwal and other days in Dhu al‑Ḥijjah sonsofsunnah.com+2Wikipedia+2Wikipedia+2.

The holiday was characterized by carnival-like celebrations, burning and beating effigies of ʿUmar, reciting cursing poetry, and subverting social norms in parody of established order. Over time, it evolved into a broader form of cultural protest against perceived injustice Wikishia+6Wikipedia+6Wikipedia+6.

Religious Framing & Symbolism

In Shi‘ite literature, the day of ʿUmar’s death is referred to as Eid al‑Zahra, Farḥat al‑Zahra, or Eidullah al‑Akbar—a “Second Ghadīr” or “Greater Eid”—marking divine justice and the vindication of Lady Fāṭimah’s prayer against oppression Wikishia+6gift2shias.com+6Iqra Online+6.

Sayyid al‑Nayṣābūrī in Taqwīm al‑Shīʿa described it as a day of rejoicing for prophets, angels, and lovers of the Ahl al‑Bayt, with recommended acts such as feeding the needy, wearing new clothes, perfuming oneself, and even taking a ritual bath (ghusl) Reddit+3gift2shias.com+3sonsofsunnah.com+3.

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Decline and Contemporary Status

Decline During Safavids to Today

While Omar Koshan was widely practiced across Iran during the Safavid and Qajar eras, it gradually diminished with the rise of Pan‑Islamism and improving Sunni–Shi‘ite relations in the late 19th century. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian government officially banned the festival due to its sectarian connotations and provocative nature, especially its incendiary language and theatrics Islam21c+4Wikipedia+4Wikipedia+4.

Today, public observances are mostly discontinued. Some clandestine or private commemorations reportedly persist in parts of Iran, but not with the same scale or official sanction, and are discouraged by many Shi‘ite leaders WikipediaWikishia.

Opposition by Shi‘ite Authorities

Renowned Shi‘ite marājiʿ (religious authorities), including Ayatullāh Khamenei, Ayatullāh al‑Ṣiṣṭānī, Ayatullāh Bahjat, and others, have criticized or prohibited these ceremonies. They argue that celebrating violence—even symbolically—is counterproductive, ignites sectarian tensions, and strays from Shi‘ism’s core principles of justice and unity WikishiaWikishia.

Khamenei described certain acts done allegedly to “please Lady Fāṭimah” (i.e. celebrating oppression of ʿUmar) as contradictory to the goals of the Iranian Revolution. Sistani emphasized focusing on shared beliefs and avoiding provocative speech likely to incite division Wikishia+1Reddit+1.

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Scholarly & Community Perspectives

Diversity of Practice

Not all Shi‘ites associate Eid al‑Zahra with ʿUmar’s death. In many Twelver communities—particularly outside Iran—the 9th of Rabiʾ al‑Awwal is commemorated for other reasons: the lifting of the angels’ pens, the imamate transfer from Hasan al‑Askari to the Hidden Imam al‑Mahdī, or the death of ʿUmar ibn Sa‘d, who led the forces that killed Imam Ḥusayn at Karbalā́ Wikishia+5Iqra Online+5Reddit+5.

As noted by some users online:

“Celebrating the death [of] ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb on the 9th of Rabiʾ al‑Awwal … makes no sense … I haven’t heard of people celebrating except among Shayrāzīs” Reddit.

Thus, the claim that Shi‘ites broadly celebrate ʿUmar’s assassination is historically inaccurate; it's confined to particular cultural–sectarian circles.

Online Narratives

Reddit discussions reflect that the ideas persist mostly within certain communities:

“This day is the day of happiness of the Ahl al‑Bayt … because the curse of Lady Fatimah … was fulfilled” — and described it as an Eid with recommended charitable and celebratory acts alwaght.net+9Islam21c+9Reddit+9Iqra Online+8Reddit+8Reddit+8.

Critics argue that equating celebration of oppression with loyalty to the Ahl al‑Bayt is misguided, and that Shi‘ism’s integrity lies in constructive memory rather than sectarian provocations.

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🎯 Summary & Reflections

• Eid al‑Zahra / Farḥat al‑Zahra, sometimes held on 9 Rabiʾ al‑Awwal, originated as commemoration of the assassination of Caliph ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb and was practiced especially in Iran under Safavid influence Wikipedia+6Wikishia+6Iqra Online+6.

• This festival, known as Omar Koshan, involved carnival-style rituals, ritualized cursing of ʿUmar, and symbolic roles of inversion and defiance Reddit+4Wikipedia+4Wikipedia+4.

• By the mid-20th century, it fell out of public support in Iran and was officially banned post-1979 due to its sectarian rhetoric and potential for unrest Wikipedia+1Wikipedia+1.

• Many respected Shi‘ite authorities today discourage such practices, emphasizing unity, respectful discourse, and focusing on shared beliefs over divisive commemorations Wikishia.

• The belief extends only to specific subgroups; mainstream Shi‘a in other regions typically mark the same date for different theological and spiritual reasons, not the death of ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb Iqra OnlineReddit.

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✅ Conclusion

While some Shi‘ite communities historically commemorated the assassination of Caliph ʿUmar ibn al‑Khattāb through the festival of Omar Koshan, this practice is neither universal nor mainstream among Twelver Shi‘ites. Rooted largely in Safavid-era Iran, the celebration has been officially discouraged and renounced by many contemporary Shi‘ite leaders, who stress intercommunal harmony and doctrinal restraint.